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EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY: BACK TO THE FUTURE
L. Timothy Perrin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Expert witnesses are at once detested and treasured. The
scorn is significant because of the increasingly prominent role
experts play in both civil and criminal litigation. Experts are
seen as mercenaries,' prostitutes' or hired guns,3 witnesses
devoid of principle who sell their opinions to the highest bidder.
Experts are not impartial professionals who explain difficult
concepts to the trier of fact.4 Rather, experts become advocates
for the side who hired them.5 The consequences of this role
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1. State ex rel. Lichter v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)..
2. See GERRY SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FOR NONE 272 (1989); Samuel P. Gross,
Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1991) ("[L]awyers and experts alike
see expert witnesses . . . as whores.").
3. See Virginia Tech Found. Inc. v. Family Group Ltd. V, 666 F. Supp. 856, 858
(W.D. Va. 1987).
4. See Michael McCloskey et al., The Experimental Psychologist in Court: The
Ethics of Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 4-5 (1986) (noting that current
practice of experimental psychologists testifying as experts is closer to advocacy than
impartial education); see also Mark S. Frankel, Ethics and the Forensic Sciences: Pro-
fessional Autonomy in the Criminal Justice System, 34 J. FORENSIC Sci. 763, 764-65
(1989) ("Historically, the law has defined the role of the expert as that of impartial
educator asked to assist the trier of fact so that the latter can decide questions
which may depend on specialized knowledge.").
5. See Terry O'Reilly, Ethics and Experts, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 113, 116 (1993)
("[T]here are experts who sincerely believe that it is their job to be advocates and to
make no attempt to be fair."); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Experimental Psychologist as Advo-
cate or Impartial Educator, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 63, 70-77 (1986) (adopting a
Darwinian approach to expert testimony: "Each individual can decide what strategy
best suits him and her, and let the survival of the fittest expert prevail."). This is
apparently not a new problem. See HENRY WADE ROGERS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTI-
MONY 94-95, 464-65 (2d ed. 1891) (arguing that expert witnesses are "zealous parti-
sans" deserving of little weight).
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change are not desirable: experts testify to matters beyond their
expertise, render opinions that are unreliable, speculative or
outside what the experts would be willing to say in their own
disciplines, and misrepresent the certainty of many scientific
principles they rely on and conclusions they reach.6 Unfortu-
nately, experts are rarely held accountable for their errors on
the witness stand:' they testify without risk of perjury prosecu-
tions' or sanctions from their professional peers.' The disdainfor experts comes from all quarters: judges,0 lawyers," com-
6. See Eymard v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (5th
Cir. 1986) (Many experts 'present studies and express opinions [in the courtroom
that] they might not be willing to express in an article submitted to a refereed jour-
nal of their discipline.").
7. See The Use and Misuse of Expert Evidence in the Courts, 77 JUDICATURE 68,
71 (1993) (A panel discussion, wherein Dr. Thomas N. Thomas, a psychiatrist, stated
that "experts testify to juries without consequence. The transcript will not be present-
ed to the Board of Medical Examiners and no one will confront the expert about his
testimony."); Gross, supra note 2, at 1178.
8. Gross, supra note 2, at 1113; Jeremial M. Long, Discovery and Experts Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REV. 665, 678 (1964); see John Van
Voorhis, Expert Opinion Evidence, 13 N.Y.L. F. 651, 657 (1967) (recounting a profes-
sional expert "who knew that he could be prosecuted for perjury in deliberately mis-
stating facts but that this could seldom be demonstrated in the case of erroneous
opinions.").
9. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1178 ("[W]hat an expert says in court is generally
invisible and inaudible in her own professional world."); O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 114
("It is pointless to rely upon the professional ethics of experts, even where such a
code exists, because most such codes have no effect and are often politely disregard-
ed.").
10. See, e.g., Eymard, 795 F.2d at 1233-34 (stating that some members of the
academy give opinions in court that they would never publish in a refereed journal
and experts sell their opinions to the highest bidder); Glover v. United States, 708 F.
Supp. 500, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[T]he most pernicious aspect of personal injury liti-
gation is the readiness with which 'expert' witnesses render opinions on matters on
which they have no competence."); Virginia Tech Found. Inc. v. Family Group Ltd.
666 F. Supp. 856, 858 (W.D. Va. 1987) ("The experts . . . did more to obfuscate the
problem than ... to clarify it. . . . [T]he hired guns did what they were hired to
do."); Clement v. Griffin, 634 So. 2d 412, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (It is "almost com-
mon knowledge that many experts were available to the highest bidder; in other
words, they will testify favorably to whomever pays for their services"); State ex rel.
Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (There is widespread concern
about the use of "mercenary" experts because they are "likely to be a greater hin-
drance to a fair trial than a biased lay witness.").
11. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 2, at 270. ("Testifying has become not only an
art but big business for many so-called scientists. . . . The swearing-for-hire business
is immense and indispensable to nearly every case. . . ."); William G. Burd &
Madelyn S. Lozano, Experts: Is the End Near for Their Use? 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 77,
78 (1993) (noting the misuse and abuse of expert testimony in the judicial process).
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mentators, 2  politicians, 3  the media, 4  and even experts
themselves."
Yet, due to liberalized rules of admission for expert testimo-
ny, 6 the explosion of scientific knowledge, and the creation of
new claims and defenses and expansion of others, 7 expert tes-
timony is used more today than ever before. 8 Lawyers seem
incapable of trying a lawsuit without one or more experts. They
pay the expert exorbitant sums of money to testify" to what-
12. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE 17-20 (1991) (discussing the
problem of unreliable scientific testimony and partisan experts); Richard A. Epstein, A
New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 758 (1992) (stating that
bias and coaching are serious problems with expert witness practice); Michael H.
Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Ade-
quate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45 (1966) (arguing that
expert witnesses are subject to strong bias in favor of party who calls them); James
W. McElhaney, Trial Notebook: Fixing the Expert Mess, 20 LITIG., Fall 1993 53, 53-55
(claiming that problems with unreliable expert testimony necessitate reform of the
rules); see generally Gross, supra note 2, at 1115 (arguing that experts have long
been abused by any number of "unflattering descriptions").
13. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The
Council on Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 247 (1992)
(reprinting the reforms proposed by then Vice-President Dan Quayle's Council on
Competitiveness regarding the use of expert witnesses and other matters).
14. See, e.g., Michael Mason, Trial and Error Courtroom Experts May Have All
the Answers, But That Doesn't Mean They're Telling the Truth, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20,
1994, at 5 ("[Elxpertise has ballooned into an industry without quality control. For
every reputable researcher, there's a quack peddling junk science, seducing judges and
juries with an air of infallibility."); Walter Olson, The Case Against Expert Witnesses,
FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989, at 133, 135 (stating that expert witnesses are willing to
testify to anything and they tend to testify more if they are partisan).
15. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1115 ("[In many l rofessions service as an expert
witness is not generally considered honest work.").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
17. See Faust F. Rossi, Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness, 12 LITIG., Fall
1985, at 18 (asserting that inflation in the use of experts is the result of (1) the
growth of complex litigation, (2) the explosion of technology and science, (3) the in-
creasing creativity of advocates, and (4) liberality of the rules of evidence).
18. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw.
U.L. REV. 643, 670 n.123 (1992) (stating that the number of experts regularly testify-
ing in Cook County, Illinois increased 1500% (from 188 to 3100) between 1974 to
1989); Anne K Smith, Opinions With a Price, 113 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
20, 1992, at 64 (reporting that demand for experts from the Technical Advisory Ser-
vice for Attorneys, a private expert referral service, has more than tripled in the last
ten years).
19. See Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert
Witnesses in the Courts-Part 11. A Three City Study, 34 JURmMETRIcS J. 193, 205
(1994) (showing that the average fee charged by expert witnesses was $185 an hour,
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ever opinion is necessary to avoid summary judgment or prevail
on the merits, regardless of how farfetched the claim or defense
may be.2" Judges, for their part, have traditionally deferred to
experts in deciding whether to admit or exclude their testimo-
ny, taking a remarkably passive role in the entire process,2
while steadily expanding the areas considered appropriate for
expert testimony." The contrast could not be more stark: the
system batters experts for their partisanship and lack of reli-
ability, while at the same time the expert is championed by
lawyers, and, at times, even rewarded by the system.
In the midst of this confusion, everyone agrees on one point:
there must be a better way.2 Yet, despite the many proposed
reforms, Rules 702 through 706 of The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which govern the admission of expert witness testimony
in federal courts, remain basically the same today as when the
rules were enacted twenty years ago.24 Clearly, the admission
with a range from $50 to $500 an hour). A previous study by the same researchers
found an average fee of $258 an hour with a range up to $1000 an hour. See Antho-
ny Champagne et al., Expert Witnesses in the Courts: An Empirical Examination, 76
JUDICATURE 5, 6-7 (1992).
20. Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 245, 247 (1986) ("It is quite apparent that experts are readily avail-
able to present essentially frivolous theories in an effort to defeat summary judgment
motions, or to create reasonable doubt.").
21. See L.L. Plotkin, Recent Development: Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.: What is the Court's Role in Evaluating Expert Testimony? 64 TUL. L. REV. 1263,
1264 (1990) ("[M]ost courts [have] passively accepted expert testimony without exam-
ining or challenging the expert's data or reasoning process. . . ."). The zenith of judi-
cial deference is likely marked by Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). "[O1n questions . . . which stand at the
frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify
[to causation], it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony." Id. at
1534.
22. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 206 (7th Cir. 1987) (admitting ex-
pert testimony on hedonic damages), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 856
F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993) (ad-
mitting psychological testimony that alleged rape victims' suffered post-traumatic
stress disorder consistent with sexual abuse); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Lieck, 845
S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (admitting expert testimony about defendant's cash
flow to prove the proper amount of punitive damages).
23. See, e.g., Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Dauber- A
New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 715, 719 (1994) ("[C]ourts can
and must do better" in controlling the use of scientific expert testimony.); Gross,
supra note 2, at 1117 ("We ought to be able to do better" in using expert evidence.).
24. Rule 704 was amended in 1984 by the addition of subdivision (b), which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
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of testimony from partisan expert witnesses presents inordi-
nately difficult and perhaps even intractable problems for the
adversary system." The combination of zealous advocates, paid
experts, liberal rules of admission, and untrained jurors raises
the question of whether the adversary system produces a reli-
able and accurate evaluation of expert witness testimony, and
whether it is capable of doing so. The United States Supreme
Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,26 gave
a firm and clear answer to that question," concluding that the
standard provided by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the tools provided by the adversary system are sufficient
means of attacking "shaky evidence," including expert testimony
that barely passes muster.28 The question, however, is not eas-
ily answered. To find the answer, one must engage in a reanal-
ysis of the roles of judges, lawyers, expert witnesses, and jurors
in our adversary system, as well as a careful balancing of im-
portant social goals and policies.
This article begins to undertake that task. It concludes that
the adversary system performs poorly in producing a fair and
accurate evaluation of expert witness testimony by the jury and
that reform is necessary. Part II of this article will lay out the
context by briefly exploring Rules 702 through 705 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and the standards for admitting expert
testimony. Part III will discuss three problems presented by
expert testimony: the partisanship of expert witnesses, the in-
No expert witness testifying with respect to the neutral state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.
FED. R. EvID. 704(b). Otherwise, the Rules have not been substantively amended
since their enactment.
25. Cf. Eymard v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir.
1986) ("Basic policy questions that affect the very nature of a trial lie behind deci-
sions to receive expert testimony."); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 17, at 26 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (Application of the adversary system of trial "in the pro-
curement and presentation of expert testimony is widely considered a sore spot in
judicial administration.").
26. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
27. Id. at 2798.
28. Id. The Court noted three specific aspects of the adversarial system that are
the traditional protections: cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
instruction of the jury on the burden of proof. Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 61 (1987)).
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adequacy of the safeguards of the adversary system, and the
ability of the ill-equipped lay jury to weigh and evaluate expert
witness testimony. Part IV will propose important changes to
the use of expert testimony: first, a call to lawyers to take the
higher ground by ending the misuse and abuse of experts; and
second, revision of Rule 702 to expressly require a showing by
the proponent of expert testimony that the testimony is reliable,
and if only marginally reliable, is also needed by the jury.
II. EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE: A PRICELESS TREASURE
Despite their many vitriolic complaints about expert witness-
es, lawyers treat them like a priceless treasure.29 Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, perhaps they are. Rules 702 through
705 have a definite "liberal thrust"" that is consistent with
the structure of the Rules as a whole.31 In fact, the Rules are
so permissive that one court has derisively warned of the "let it
all in" approach that seems to govern expert testimony.32
Thus, although the Federal Rules of Evidence are not the sole
reason for the high value placed on experts and their ever-in-
creasing use,33 they are the primary one.34 The Rules provide
experts with powerful testimonial tools, such as a minimal
29. Cf Mason, supra note 14, at 6 ("A persuasive witness is a pearl, and lawyers
don't always check thoroughly for flaws.").
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993);
see 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 702-36
(1995) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE] (The Federal Rules place an emphasis on
"liberalizing expert testimony."); Lee N. Miller, Cross Examination of Expert Witnesses:
Dispelling the Aura of Reliability, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1073, 1084 (1988) ("The liber-
al approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence has led the majority of courts to allow
an expert to testify to virtually anything.").
31. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing that all relevant evidence is admissible ex-
cept as excluded by the Constitution, Act of Congress, other Federal Rules, or the
Supreme Court).
32. See Eymard v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.
1986). But see Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-95 (A liberal standard under the Federal
Rules does not mean "that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility
of purportedly scientific evidence.").
33. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
34. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 18; see also Green, supra note 18, at 668-70
(identifying the expansion of liability theories and the liberalization of the Federal
Rules of Evidence as the causes of the increase of expert testimony).
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standard of qualification,35 almost limitless permissible areas
of testimony, the use of opinion testimony, the ability to state
an opinion that encompasses the ultimate issue and to state it
before giving the basis of the opinion, and the right to rely on
inadmissible evidence in forming opinions.36 Experts not only
explain the evidence, but by the opinions they render they also
are a source of evidence for the jury.37 These tools make ex-
perts important witnesses in every case. The extensive testi-
fying experience of many experts makes them not only power-
ful, but also persuasive witnesses, capable of making or de-
stroying a case.38
A. The Boundaries of Expert Testimony
1. Qualifications
Rule 702 is generous in its definition of an expert.39 It pro-
vides that individuals may be qualified to testify as an expert
by their "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." °
The standard is not difficult to satisfy.4 "Almost everyone
qualifies as an expert in one field or another."2 It is rare for a
trial court to exclude an expert witness because of a failure to
qualify, and rarer yet for an appellate court to disturb the trial
judge's decision.
35. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
36. See FED. R. EvID. 703-705.
37. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1140. Professor Gross observes that one of the
major functions of experts is to "create new evidence in the form of expert opinions."
Id. In reaching the opinions, the expert may generate additional observations through
the conduct of studies or experiments. Id. This allows experts to manipulate the evi-
dence and their opinions in unlimited ways. See id. This aspect of freedom or open-
endedness is a powerful feature of expert testimony. See id.
38. Cf William S. Bailey, Expert Witnesses in the Sound-Bite Era, 29 TRIAL, Feb.
1993, at 65, 69 ("Winning or losing at trial depends largely on the persuasiveness of
experts.... If you win the battle of the experts, you are also likely to win the
war.").
39. See FED. R. EviD. 702.
40. Id.
41. See JAMES W. MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY'S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 276 (3d ed. 1994)
("In Baltimore they say, 'Anyone with a mustache can be an expert.'").
42. Graham, supra note 12, at 73.
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Rule 702's definition includes so-called "skilled witnesses,"
such as bankers, landowners, or car mechanics," as well as
witnesses with no formal education, but substantial experi-
ence," or conversely, witnesses with substantial formal educa-
tion, but no practical experience.45 The judge decides the issue
as a preliminary question under Rule 104(a)4' based on a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard.47 The central focus of the
inquiry is whether the witness's testimony "will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue." 4' Any lawyer who has sought to exclude a witness from
testifying as an expert based on lack of qualification knows the
court's response to the request all too well: "it goes to the
weight, Counsel."49
2. Subject Matter
Before an expert testifies, the proponent of the evidence must
show that the subject matter is appropriate for expert testimo-
43. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
44. See, e.g., T-Bill Option Club v. Brown & Co. Sec. Corp., 23 F.3d 410 (7th Cir.
1994) (allowing an expert to testify about options and margin rules because of his ex-
perience in the industry but despite absence of formal education in the field); United
States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that expert
testimony regarding the conditions of two buses altered for smuggling marijuana from
Mexico was properly received from a bus mechanic with 30 years of experience).
45. See, e.g., Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 910 F.2d 167, 176-77
(5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 171 (1993) (allowing an expert with a doctor-
ate in mechanical engineering to be qualified to testify about the defective design of a
press brake even though he had never designed one).
46. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 702-52. Rule 104(a) provides, in
pertinent part:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).
FED. R. EVD. 104(a).
47. See Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987).
48. FED. R. EVID. 702; see Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1990) (Un-
der Rule 702, "helpfulness to the trier of fact is [the] 'touchstone.'"); 3 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 702-60.
49. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 197
(1993) (stating that the typical response of a judge to a motion to exclude an expert
from testifying is to rule that the objection goes only to the weight, not the admissi-
bility, of the testimony); see also Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549,
569 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing the tendency of judges to respond to expert testimo-
ny objections by stating "the jury will give it 'the weight it deserves.'").
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ny.5" Once again, the permissiveness of the Rule is evident.5'
First, there is no obvious competency standard in the Rule by
which expert testimony can be measured.52 Instead, the subject
matter of the testimony must be "specialized knowledge," a
purposefully broad and vague term.53 Second, the Rule does
not appear to require that the testimony concern only matters
beyond the juror's common knowledge. 4 Instead, Rule 702 im-
poses a helpfulness standard, otherwise known as a mere rele-
vance requirement.55
Helpfulness does not involve a detailed inquiry into the
expert's opinions or methodology. Rather, the court simply asks:
"On this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable
help?"5" Testimony from a qualified expert about a relevant
matter that is the proper subject of expert testimony is pre-
sumed to be helpful under Rule 702.5' Thus, doubts about the
helpfulness of an expert's testimony are generally resolved in
favor of admission.55 The jury is relied upon to resolve ques-
tions about the validity or reliability of an expert's opinions or
theories. Judge Weinstein says: "The jury is intelligent enough,
aided by counsel, to ignore what is unhelpful in its delibera-
tions."59 The only real check on this kind of expert testimony
is Rule 403,60 which excludes evidence when its probative val-
50. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 18-19.
51. MCELHANEY, supra note 41, at 276 (In Cleveland the motto is, "An expert can
say anything.").
52. See McElhaney, supra note 12, at 53-54 (Rule 702 "doesn't have anything to
do with how reliable scientific evidence has to be.").
53. See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note ("The rule is broadly
phrased. The fields of knowledge . .. extend to all 'specialized' knowledge.").
54. See 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 702-10; infra text accompa-
nying notes 63-69.
55. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795-96 (Rule
702's requirement of helpfulness "goes primarily to relevance."). Obviously, testimony
that is not relevant under Rule 401 is not helpful to the trier of fact. Id. Rule 401
defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
56. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923, at 29 (Chadbourne rev. 1978).
57. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 280 (3d Cir.
1983), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Mitsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Rossi, supra note 17, at 19.
58. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 702[02], at 702-37.
59. Id.
60. FED. R. EvID. 403. Rule 403 provides:
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ue is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
or concerns of misleading or confusing the juror or wasting
time.6 Yet, Rule 403 is not much of a check because, like Rule
702, it provides a tilted standard toward admission and places
the burden of proof on the opponent of the evidence.62
Traditionally, courts have excluded expert opinions about
matters within the common knowledge and experience of the
jurors.63 For example, an expert was not permitted to testify
that guardrails could prevent a person from falling off a scaf-
fold because that is a matter of common knowledge.64
Rule 702's "helpfulness" standard expands the admission of
expert testimony to include matters of common knowledge if it
is "helpful."65 Although some courts continue to invoke the fa-
miliar mantra "beyond the ken of the jury,"66 most courts ad-
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Id.
61. See id.
62. See CHRISTOPHER R. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 193 (1995)
("Rule [403] is designed to favor admissibility.").
63. See 2 JONES ON EVIDENCE 607 (Spencer A. Gard, ed., 6th ed. 1972). Judge
Gard states the common law rule as follows:
The rule is that in the discretion of the court expert testimony
may be excluded if all primary facts can be accurately and intelligibly
described to the jury, and if they, as men of common understanding are
as capable of comprehending the primary facts and of drawing correct
conclusions from them as are the witnesses possessed of special or pecu-
liar training, experience, or observation.
The decisive consideration in determining whether expert opinion
evidence is necessary is whether the subject of inquiry is sufficiently
beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact, or on the other hand, is one of such common knowledge
that men of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently
as the witness.
Id. (citations omitted).
64. See Hernandez v. Power Constr. Co., 382 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ill. 1978).
65. See FED. R. EID. 702; 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 702-20
(common knowledge exclusion is "incompatible with the standard of helpfulness ex-
pressed in Rule 702.").
66. The Second Circuit in particular continues to espouse this standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that law en-
forcement agent's testimony about the "operational methods of organized crime fami-
lies" satisfied the "beyond the ken of the average juror" standard); United States v.
Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that expert testimony about the
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mit "expert" testimony about the most ordinary matters. For ex-
ample, courts have admitted expert testimony under Rule 702
that a red emergency stop button on an escalator would attract
small children,17 that it was unsafe to permit plaintiff to dive
in shallow water," and that the defendant's seized clothing
was the same clothing worn by the robbers in a surveillance
photograph. 9
Information that once would have been brought out by the
lawyer on cross examination and argued during closing argu-
ment is now brought out through an expert witness who has
access to all the testimonial advantages the Rules provide to
experts. The expert can even testify to opinions that embrace
the ultimate issue, thus enhancing the advocate role of the
expert.
3. Ultimate Issues
Expert witnesses are not only permitted to testify to almost
anything that assists the jury, but also they can give their
opinion on the ultimate issue that the jury is to decide.7 0 The
Federal Rules of Evidence thus expand the common law7 '
which prohibited experts from stating opinions on ultimate
issues because to do so would invade or usurp the province of
the jury.7 2
Rule 704 eliminates that objection, except with regard to the
mental state of the defendant when that mental state consti-
tutes an element of the crime charged. 3 The proper objection
operations of narcotics dealers is admissible only if it is "beyond the ken of the aver-
age juror").
67. Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1990).
68. Leonard v Pitstick Dairy Lake and Park, Inc., 464 N.E. 2d 644, 649 (IM. App.
Ct. 1984) (reh'g denied June 28, 1985).
69. United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1084 n.14 (9th Cir. 1983). But see
United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir. 1989).
70. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a). Rule 704(a) provides, in pertinent part: "[Tiestimony
in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable be-
cause it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Id.
71. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 704-07.
72. See Owen v. Kerr McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rule
704(a) "was enacted to change the old view that the giving [of] an opinion on an
ultimate issue would 'usurp the function' or 'invade the province' of the jury.").
73. See FED. R. EvID. 704(b). Rule 704(b) was enacted in 1984 as part of the
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now is that the expert's testimony is not helpful or it abridges
Rule 403. 74
Although this change is supported by logic and necessity, it
has led to some unfortunate abuses. Examples abound of judges
who have allowed experts to testify to legal conclusions, essen-
tially telling the jury how to decide the case. An engineer was
allowed to testify in a products liability case that the product
was "unreasonably dangerous;"75 an expert concluded in his
testimony that the defendants were "deliberately indifferent" to
decedent's medical needs;76 and an expert for plaintiff in an
antitrust case opined that the defendants had conspired to
violate the antitrust laws.77
Such testimony not only wastes time, but it can overwhelm
the jury and result in an expert swearing match about which
side should win. This only serves to confuse and distract the
jury from its factfinding. Therefore, it is not surprising that
when experts become partisans they turn their testimony into
summations, telling the jury how to decide the case and why.73
4. The Form and Timing of the Expert's Opinion
Rule 7057' represents another expansion of expert witness
Insanity Defense Reform Act, which arose out of the acquittal of John Hinckley on
charges of attempting to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and shooting Press
Secretary James Brady. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 30, at 704-17 & n.4. For the text of Rule 704(b), see supra note 24.
74. See 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 704-10.
75. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1260-61 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
76. Heflin v. Stewart County, 958 F.2d 709, 715 (6th Cir. 1992) reh'g en banc
denied 968 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1990). But see Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,
1353 (6th Cir. 1994) (reaching opposite conclusion; expert testimony on "deliberate
indifference" is not admissible).
77. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 280 (3d Cir.
1983), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Mitsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
78. See Eymard v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir.
1986) (Trial judges "ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more
than lawyers can offer in argument." It is too easy for the expert to "become nothing
more than an advocate of policy before the jury.").
79. FED. R. EVID. 705. Rule 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons
therefore without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless
the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
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testimony. Historically, expert opinions were disclosed by asking
a hypothetical question, which included all of the facts and data
that supported the opinion." The questions were often long
and complex, making expert testimony unnecessarily difficult
and protracted. 1 Rule 705 substantially reduces the need to
use hypothetical questions and leaves it up to the examining
lawyer (subject to the judge's discretion) to decide how best to
disclose the expert's opinions.
Experts may reveal their opinion before they explain the
facts or data that support the opinion, or they may give their
opinion on direct without ever explaining the underlying bas-
es.82 Of course, opposing counsel is entitled to explore the sup-
porting material on cross examination and the judge has discre-
tion to require disclosure of the underlying data on direct."
5. The Expert's Basis
The "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules' treatment of expert
testimony reaches its zenith in Rule 703.' Rule 703 allows
consideration by experts of not only matters that have not been
introduced into evidence, but also of matters that are inadmissi-
ble. Like Rule 704, this expansion has resulted in unforeseen
and unintended abuses, most significantly the use of the expert
as a "conduit" of hearsay.85
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Id.
80. John F. Sutton, Article VII: Opinions and Expert Testimony, 30 HOUS. L. REV.
797, 800 (1993). Only in the event that the expert had personal knowledge of the
facts could the expert state an opinion without a hypothetical question. Id.
81. See FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note (The use of hypothetical
questions has been criticized because it encourages "partisan bias," allows the party
the opportunity of "summing up in the middle of the case," and it is "complex and
time consuming."); Graham, supra note 12, at 67.
82. See FED. R. EVID. 705.
83. See id.
84. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvD. 703.
85. See Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in
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Rule 703 provides three bases for expert opinions: 1) facts or
data within the expert's personal knowledge; 2) facts or data
the expert learns at or before the hearing; and 3) facts or data
that are inadmissible, but "reasonably relied" upon by the ex-
pert.8" The first two are a continuation of prior practice, but
the third option is new" and has produced a startling phe-
nomenon: the wholesale introduction of hearsay evidence based
upon the expert's reliance on it.
The change was intended to bring the judicial practice into
line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in
court, such as the practice of physicians who make "life and
death decisions" in reliance on statements from patients, rela-
tives, nurses, and others." Not surprisingly, many courts have
taken the broadest possible approach in applying Rule 703.
They have deferred to the expert witness in deciding whether
the expert reasonably relied upon the hearsay evidence,89 and
then have allowed the admission of the hearsay into evidence
on direct examination without conducting any inquiry into the
reliability of the evidence."0 Some courts have recognized a
Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 859 (1992) (experts are used as conduits of
hearsay) (quoting Dep't of Corrections v. Williams 549 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989)).
86. See FED. R. EvID. 703.
87. Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or 'Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the
Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 COR-
NELL L. REV. 350, 355-56 (1992).
88. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
89. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 280 (3d Cir.
1983), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Mitsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (stating that a judge should defer to the experts in decid-
ing "reasonable reliance"). The Third Circuit recently rejected this deferential ap-
proach because of the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert. See In re Paoli Railroad
Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir. 1994) (amended Oct. 17, 1994) (The stan-
dard under Rule 703 is "equivalent" to Rule 702's reliability requirement--there must
be good grounds on which to find the data reliable."); cf. United States v. Locascio, 6
F.3d 924, 938-39 (2d Cir. 1993) (Post-Daubert decision upholding judge's discretion to
reject expert testimony based on questionable data, but declining to require a "man-
datory and explicit trustworthiness analysis.").
90. See, e.g., United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1987) (uphold-
ing admission of hearsay relied on by an arson expert because expert testified that
reliance on such hearsay was "a standard investigatory technique"); Lewis v. Rego
Co., 757 F.2d 66, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that it was an abuse of discretion to
permit cross examination of an expert regarding his opinion and the basis for it un-
der the facts of this case); Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 634 F. Supp. 137, 142-43
(E.D. Pa. 1986), affd, 806 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1986) (unpublished decision).
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much more active role for the court in this determination.91
Everyone agrees, however, that the underlying facts are admit-
ted only to explain the basis of the experts opinion, not for
their truth.92 The opponent of the evidence is entitled to a lim-
iting instruction under Rule 105;" that is, if the opponent
wants one.
Thus, under Rule 703 jurors are asked to do the impossible.
They are told to consider the hearsay, not for its truth, but
only as the basis of the experts opinion.9" No one truly be-
lieves jurors (or anyone else for that matter) are capable of
making that subtle distinction.95 Instead, jurors consider the
hearsay even when the evidence is regarded as too unreliable
for admission as substantive evidence.
91. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110-11, 1113-
15 (5th Cir. 1991) (making independent inquiry into the basis of plaintiffs expert
opinion); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-55 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); see also Shatkin v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 207-208 (2d Cir. 1984); Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d
498, 505 (5th Cir. 1983).
92. See Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 729 (6th Cir. 1994)
(admitting inadmissible evidence to explain the basis of the expert's opinion); Rossi,
supra note 17, at 23.
93. Engebretsen, 21 F.3d at 729; Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d
1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 1984); see Rossi, supra note 17, at 23. Rule 105 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence provides: "When evidence which is admissible as to one party or
for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. EVID. 105.
94. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 22-23 ("[Tlhe subtlety of this distinction [between
admitting hearsay for its truth and admitting it as the basis of the expert's opinion]
is likely to escape triers of fact, especially jurors."). The drafters of the rules recog-
nized the particular difficulty jurors have in distinguishing between "truth" and "ba-
sis." See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note. Rule 803(4) expands its
scope to include statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling
him to testify, based upon the conclusion that such statements were already admissi-
ble to show the basis of the doctor's opinion under Rule 703 and that "[t]he distinc-
tion thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries." Id. (emphasis add-
ed).
95. See Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (The limiting
instruction is a "recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond,
not only their powers, but anybody's else."). There is empirical data to support this
position. E.g., Jonathan D. Casper & Kenneth M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome
Information and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases in
INSIDE THE JUROR 65, 82 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (concluding from studies that the
jury considers and is influenced by evidence they are instructed to disregard).
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B. Scientific Expert Testimony
Complex scientific and technical matters present entirely
different problems. Judges, lawyers, and commentators have
long recognized that jurors are poorly suited to resolve disputes
between experts concerning matters about which the jurors
know little or nothing." Historically, courts recognized two
types of expert testimony: (1) novel scientific evidence, and (2)
all other expert testimony. 7 If the testimony did not involve
some novel scientific technique or theory, the court simply ap-
plied the helpfulness standard from Rule 702.
1. Historical Approaches
Before Daubert there were at least two approaches to novel
scientific evidence: (1) the relevance test" and (2) the Frye
general acceptance test.9 The former was simply an applica-
tion of the helpfulness standard under Rule 702 to scientific
evidence with the recognition that unreliable theories or tech-
niques are not helpful to the jury.' The relevancy approach
focused on three factors: (1) the reliability of the technique or
96. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 51-52 (1901). A California appellate court recently
noted this concern in discussing the admissibility of the prosecution's DNA evidence.
The court stated:
To . . . leave it to jurors to assess the current scientific debate on statis-
tical calculation as a matter of weight rather than admissibility...
would be asking jurors to do what judges carefully avoid-decide the sub-
stantive merits of competing scientific opinion as to the reliability of a
novel method of scientific proof. We cannot reasonably ask the average
juror to decide such arcane questions....
People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (1992). But see Christophersen v. Allied-
Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1991) (Reavley, J., dissenting)(arguing
that "we routinely entrust difficult determinations to jurors that assume their posses-
sion and use of critical capacities" and concluding that although juries may not be
ideal they are "the essential voice of the community in solving one problem fairly
brought before it"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
97. See 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 702[02]-[03].
98. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1985). Downing
also notes a third approach consisting of "suggested variations on the Frye standard."
Id. (citations omitted).
99. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
100. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230, 1233.
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theory used to produce the evidence; (2) Rule 403 concerns of
overwhelming, confusing, or misleading the jury; and (3) the
relevance or "fit" of the scientific evidence to the factual issues
in the case.'' Under this approach, the fact that a new theory
was not broadly accepted in the applicable scientific community
was not fatal, provided that it satisfied the minimum standard
of reliability required for the evidence to assist the jury.10 2
The general acceptance test, on the other hand, focused on a
single inquiry: whether the theory or technique used by the
expert had gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community. 0 3 This approach originated with Frye v. United
States,' a 1923 case decided by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, and was the dominant approach of federal
courts when Daubert was decided.0 5 Despite the many criti-
cisms of Frye, '0 courts followed its general acceptance ap-
101. See id. at 1237.
102. See id. at 1238-39. Instead of using the single general acceptance factor,
Downing provided an illustrative list of seven factors that should be considered in
deciding the helpfulness of the evidence. The factors include the following:
1) degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific community;
2) "the novelty of the new technique";
3) the existence of specialized literature about the technique;
4) qualifications of the expert;
5) non-judicial uses of the scientific techniques;
6) error rate; and
7) prior judicial acceptance
See id.
103. See Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (5th Cir.
1991). In Frye the District of Columbia Circuit Court stated:
[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.c. Cir. 1923).
104. Frye, 293 F.2d 1013. Frye concerned the admission of testimony about a sys-
tolic blood pressure deception test, a precursor to the polygraph. See id. at 1013.
105. At the time Daubert was decided, seven circuits followed Frye and two circuits
followed the relevancy approach. See David Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball
at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present and
Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1835
n.33 (1994).
106. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208-28 (1980);
Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67
IOWA L. REv. 879, 885-86 (1982). Professor Giannefli, in his important article, syn-
thesized the problems with Frye as follows:
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proach because of two positive features: questions about the
reliability of new scientific theories or techniques were decided
by their acceptance in the pertinent scientific community, not
among judges or lawyers, and it treated expert testimony about
novel scientific matters with caution because of its "aura of
infallibility.'
107
Although the two approaches both seek to keep out unreli-
able expert testimony, court rulings sometimes turned on which
approach was taken.' In Daubert, the Supreme Court finally
ventured into the debate and adopted a standard of reliability
that raises more questions than it answers."9
2. Daubert's Approach to Scientific Evidence
Eric Schuller and Jason Daubert, the plaintiffs in Daubert,
were born with severe birth defects. They sued the maker of
Bendectin, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, and alleged that their
condition was caused by their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin,
an anti-nausea drug, during pregnancy."' Merrell Dow
1) Inconsistent or inaccurate identification of the relevant field in which the
principle falls, Gianelli, supra at 1208-10;
2) The manipulation of or failure to address the extent of acceptance required
by the relevant scientific community, id. at 1210-11;
3) Failure to resolve whether Frye requires general acceptance of the scientific
technique or both the underlying principle and the technique, id. at 1211-15;
4) Difficulties in determining what proof is necessary to establish general accep-
tance, id. at 1215-19;
5) Selective application of the Frye doctrine, caused in part by varying defini-
tions of "scientific evidence," id. at 1219-21;
6) Confusion concerning the appropriate standard of review on appeal, id. at
1222-23.
It is interesting to note that several of these criticisms, which justified to many
the abandonment of Frye, continue to plague the law of expert testimony after the
Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert. See infra Part IV.C.1.
107. See Giannelli, supra note 106, at 1207, 1224 ("The requirement of general
acceptance in the scientific community assures that the most qualified to assess the
general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice."); United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
108. Compare Addison, 498 F.2d at 745 (excluding spectrographic voice identifica-
tion evidence based on lack of general acceptance under Frye standard) and People v.
Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1976) (same) with United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1197-1201 (2d Cir. 1978) (admitting spectrographic voice identification evi-
dence based on its reliability under relevancy test).
109. See infra Part IV.C.1.
110. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
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brought a motion for summary judgment supported by an af-
fidavit of their expert, which concluded that no published epide-
miological study had found any causal link between the inges-
tion of Bendectin during pregnancy and birth defects in hu-
mans."'
Plaintiffs offered evidence from eight highly credentialed
experts who did not contest Merrell Dow's characterization of
the extant epidemiological research, but nevertheless concluded
that Bendectin can cause birth defects based on other types of
research and a re-analysis of the epidemiological data." The
district court, applying Frye, granted summary judgment be-
cause plaintiffs scientific evidence was not "sufficiently estab-
lished to have general acceptance in the field to which it be-
longs.""3 The Ninth Circuit affirmed." 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires expert testimony to
be reliable and supported by appropriate validation based on
what is known."'
The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert provided both the
expected and the unexpected. First, the expected: the Court
held that Frye's general acceptance test did not survive the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence."' This result was
111. Id. Defendant's expert, Dr. Steven H. Lamm, a physician and epidemiologist,
stated that he had reviewed 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients. Id.
112. Id. Plaintiffs' experts included Shanna Swan, the chief of the section of the
California Department of Health and Services that determines causes of birth defects,
who had a doctorate in statistics, and Stewart A. Newman who had a doctorate in
chemistry and had studied the effect of chemicals on limb development for over a
decade. The other experts retained by plaintiffs had equally impressive credentials.
Id. at 2971 n.2. The experts did not rely exclusively on epidemiological studies as did
defendants. Rather, they used other data such as in vitro (or test tube) studies, in
vivo (or animal) studies, pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of
Bendectin, and a reanalysis of the published epidemiological studies. Id. at 2791.
113. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.
Cal. 1989).
114. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1128-29 (9th
Cir. 1991 ).
115. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
116. Id. at 2794. This result was not unexpected because the Court has taken a
"plain meaning" approach to interpreting the Rules of Evidence, generally refusing to
recognize or follow common law rules or principles that are not expressly retained by
the Rules. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987) (construing plain
language of Rule 104(a) to allow judge to consider disputed co-conspirator statement
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predictable based upon the Court's recent construction of the
Rules of Evidence."7 The Court surprised many though, by
finding a reliability requirement in the express language of
Rule 702 instead of finding it as a necessary component of
helpfulness."' The term "scientific ... knowledge," as used in
the Rule, imposes a reliability requirement on expert testimo-
ny." The standard of reliability is measured by "scientific va-
lidity."2 ° In other words, courts must determine as a prelimi-
nary matter whether "the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid."12' This new standard
gives a judge an active role with expert testimony. As the
"gatekeeper," the judge must make a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodolo-
gy can be applied to the facts in issue.
122
in deciding preliminary question of existence of conspiracy despite contrary common
law rule).
117. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
118. See id. at 2795. The expectation was that the Court would decide between the
relevancy approach and the Frye general acceptance test. In fact, one of the two
questions on which the Court granted the writ of certiorari was whether Frye was
adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the other was whether Frye required
peer review and publication. Brief for Petitioner, at 3, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102) (1992 WL 541269); see
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992) (grant of certiorari by Supreme Court).
119. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct at 2795. The Court referred to one of its favorite
sources-Webster's Third New International Dictionary-to define "scientific" and
"knowledge." Id. The Court stated:
The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in the methods and proce-
dures of science. Similarly, the word "knowledge" connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term "applies to any
body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or
accepted as truths on good grounds."
Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
120. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9. There has been much debate and commen-
tary over distinctions between validity and reliability in science and reliable evidence.
See, e.g., Bert Black, A United Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
595, 599 (1988). In a footnote destined to be cited often, the Court resolved the de-
bate, at least for now. The requirement is evidentiary reliability. That is, the expert's
theories and techniques must be trustworthy in the same way that hearsay must be
trustworthy and in the same way that witnesses must testify from personal knowl-
edge. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9. When scientific evidence is involved, however,
trustworthiness or "evidentiary reliability" is possible only when the evidence has
scientific validity; that is, the principle supports what it purports to show. Id.
121. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
122. Id. at 2790.
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This trustworthiness requirement varies from the relevancy
approach in one important way: it is not simply one aspect of
the helpfulness determination. Rather, the court must make an
independent determination of reliability. Rule 702 is a rule of
competence; it requires that expert testimony be reliable and
relevant. 3
In making the reliability determination, the Supreme Court
identified four non-exclusive "general observations" to assist the
undertaking.' Not surprisingly, general acceptance is one of
the factors courts may consider,' as well as peer review and
publication. "6 These factors provide circumstantial evidence of
reliability. 7 Peer review and publication is simply one step
toward obtaining general acceptance. Perhaps the primary ques-
tion under Daubert's formulation, however, is "whether a theory
or technique ... can be (and has been) tested." 8 After all,
trial and error and falsifying hypotheses are the distinctive
marks of science." Finally, the Court directs consideration of
123. See id. at 2794 ("[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."). Daubert provides
a two prong inquiry the trial judge must make initially under Rule 104(a): "whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1)scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Id. at 2796.
124. Id. at 2796-97. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens dissented from
the "general observations" made by the Court for three reasons: (1) they were unnec-
essary to decide the case; (2) they raised more questions than they answered; and (3)
they were unclear. Id at 2799-800.
125. Id. at 2797. Despite the confusion that is bound to follow from including gen-
eral acceptance as a reliability factor after declaring Frye dead, it is well established
that general acceptance is an important consideration in deciding scientific validity.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985). After Daubert, proof of
general acceptance will likely always result in admission of the evidence. See id.
("[We expect that a technique that satisfies the Frye test usually be found to be
reliable as well."); see also Daubert 113 S. Ct. at 2797 ("Widespread acceptance can
be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible."). Daubert is more
liberal than Frye in at least one sense, however, because it leaves open the possibility
that theories and techniques that are not yet generally accepted might be reliable,
and thus, admissible. Id
126. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. This factor is not dispositive, according to the
Court, but it is a component of "good science." Id.
127. See McElhaney, supra note 12, at 53, 54.
128. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97
129. Id. The application of the scientific knowledge factor was of particular concern
to Chief Justice Rehnquist. He argued that the Federal Rules do not give judges "the
obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists" in performing their
gatekeeping responsibility. Despite his confidence in federal judges, Rehnquist ex-
pressed concern that application of this factor, including determining the "falsifiabili-
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the rate of error of the technique and an examination of the
existence of standards that control the technique's opera-
tion.13
0
Daubert has something for everyone.'' For Frye proponents
it finds a requirement of reliability in the language of Rule 702
and identifies "general acceptance" as one of the factors courts
should use. 132 For proponents of the relevancy approach, it
pronounces Frye dead, as it is "at odds with the 'liberal thrust'
of the Federal Rules."33 For commentators, it creates a pleth-
ora of questions about its application, ranging from the basic:
"what constitutes scientific knowledge under Rule 702?" to the
arcane: "what confidence interval is required to satisfy the rate
of error factor?" to the procedural: "what is the standard of
review on appeal?" This merely demonstrates that reliability
may sound better than general acceptance as a standard of ad-
mission, but it will be at least as difficult to apply.
C. Summary
Experts are powerful witnesses. The expert is largely free of
the restraints the rules impose on everyone else. Opinion testi-
mony is not simply allowed, it is expected. Even opinions that
embrace the ultimate issue are permitted. Personal knowledge
is unnecessary. Testimony on matters of common knowledge is
allowed. Theories and methodologies that are rejected by most
experts can be used. The expert is permitted to use hearsay in
forming an opinion and to tell the jury about it. The structure
of the rules of evidence provides the context to understand why
experts are so attractive to lawyers and why expert abuse and
misuse is so widespread.
ty" of the theory, would be beyond the capacity of most federal judges. Id. at 2799-
800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.).
130. Id. at 2797
131. See Kenneth R. Foster et al., Science and the Toxic Tort, 261 SCIENCE, Sept.
17, 1993, at 1509, 1614 ("Astonishingly, all parties expressed satisfaction with the
Daubert decision."); Paul Houston, High Court Relaxes Curbs on Expert Witness Testi-
mony Law: Ruling Praised for Allowing Flexibility, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at A14
("Lawyers on both sides of the [Daubert] case claimed victory, disagreeing on how rig-
orous the court's screening guidelines are.").
132. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
133. Id. at 2794.
1410
1995] EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 1411
III. THE EXPERT WITNESS AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM:
PROBLEMS OF BIAS, INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS, AND
INCOMPETENCE
The generosity of the Federal Rules of Evidence in admitting
substantial amounts of expert testimony has not only increased
the use of experts, but it has also contributed to a significant
change in the profile of the typical expert witness. There is now
a large and expanding industry consisting of individuals who
spend substantial portions of their time testifying for or con-
sulting with litigants."M Thousands of experts, spanning an
incredible array of subjects, advertise their availability to testify
as expert witnesses.'35 Even more disturbing is the recent de-
velopment and growth of firms offering expert referral services,
whereby the agency will find an expert that fits the needs of
134. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 599 A.2d 149, 156 (N.J. 1991) ("'he business of
being an expert has become a cottage industry." (quoting Joseph M. McLaughlin,
Discovery and Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 760, 763
(1988)). In Cook County between 1974 and 1989, the number of regularly testifying
experts increased 1,540% from 188 to 3,100. Andrew Blum, Experts: How Good Are
They?, NArL L.J., August 24, 1989, at 1, col. 4. In a study of 529 civil trials that
resulted in jury verdicts in California Superior Courts in 1985 and 1986, experts
testified in 86% of the cases, and there was an average of 3.3 experts per trial.
Gross, supra note 2, at 1119.
135. See, e.g., 29 TRIAL 82, 82-92 (Dec. 1993). (containing over 50 advertisements
by expert witness and expert referral services and more than 100 classified ads for
experts); 79 A.B.A. J., Jan 1993, 106, 106-111 (containing over 100 classified ads for
experts, but fewer than ten for lawyers).
One example of this phenomenon is the fifth edition of the Southwestern Direc-
tory of Expert Witnesses and Consultants. The directory includes the advertisements
of 143 persons or firms promoting their expertise in everything from "above ground
power lines" to "zinc," and "sport accidentology" to "traumatology." See TEXAS LAWYER
SouTHWEsTERN DIRECTORY OF EXPERT WITNESSES 6, 32-33, 36 (5th ed., 1994-95).
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the lawyer.3 ' The referral firm gets paid for finding a match,
and is like a headhunter agency for experts.
Unfortunately, that is not the worst of it. In some urban
areas medical clinics are springing up, advertising their services
to treat "work related injuries" or "injuries from automobile
accidents," and informing the audience that referrals to lawyers
are "available upon request.""7 This is just what the system
needed: a direct feeder system from doctors to lawyers and back
again. Professional experts are no longer anomalous. They are
is now commonplace,"' and bring a pervasive bias to expert
testimony.'
136. See Anne Kates Smith, Opinions With a Price, 113 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 20, 1992, 64. According to Smith, the Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys
(TASA) listed more than 18,500 experts on its rolls. Id. More recently, in 1994, the
author received a promotional brochure from TASA stating: "TASA's comprehensive
roster includes more than 22,000 experts in over 5,500 categories of expertise." (The
brochure is on file with the author.) Trial magazine includes numerous such referral
services in its advertisements, most of which claim to have thousands of experts. See
29 TRIAL, December 1993, 82, 82-92. Some of the referral services take care to note
that their experts are not "professional" or "commercial" witnesses. Id. at 86 (Ameri-
can Medical Forensic Specialists, Inc. claiming they provide only "[c]redible experts:
no 'commercial' witnesses."); id. at 90 (Physicians for Quality asserted that "[o]ur
physicians have jury credibility because they are medical professionals, not profession-
al witnesses."). There are also legal organizations that maintain lists of experts and
their areas of expertise. See, e.g., id. at 84 (ATLA Exchange, an expert witness data-
base. advertising its availability to members of the American Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion, including the names of experts in over 600 categories.); SPENCE, supra note 2,
at 272 (describing the Defense Institute's computer bank "listing willing witnesses in
every conceivable field of expertise.").
137. On a recent visit to the Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas area, the author saw tele-
vision advertisements for "K Clinics," which included a statement about the avail-
ability of consultations with lawyers.
138. See Eymard v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.
1986); see also Graham, supra note 12, at 44 ('Fne professional expert witness
has . . . become a fact of life in American litigation."); Gross, supra note 2, at 1131
(noting that many experts become professional witnesses).
139. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1132. Gross states the problem this way: "The
problem is professional partisanship. Experts whose incomes depend on testimony
must learn to satisfy the consumers who buy that testimony; those who do not will
not get hired. In some cases experts may distort their views to suit the interests of
their clients, perhaps even lie outright. . . ." Id.
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A. The Problem of Money
It is illegal to pay for a witness's testimony, other than nomi-
nal witness fees and expenses.' This long held, well-estab-
lished rule is necessary to protect the integrity of the adversary
system. Purchased testimony obstructs the process and inter-
feres with truth-seeking. Yet, it is necessary to pay expert wit-
nesses, typically based on the expert's hourly rate, to obtain the
services of the expert.' Of course, the payment is not for a
particular opinion from the expert or a particular outcome in
the case. To the contrary, the use of contingent fee agreements
with experts, which make the expert's compensation contingent
upon the case's outcome, is prohibited by the ethical rules of
most jurisdictions. The system refuses to tolerate that kind
of direct bias." Nevertheless, the payment of experts for their
time and expertise is tolerated, even though it creates a sub-
stantial incentive for the expert to advocate a party's position
that is not supported by available research and data. This prob-
lem is particularly acute with the professional witness, who
makes her living testifying as an expert.' Obviously, such a
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1988) (It is illegal to offer or accept "anything of
value ... for or because of testimony under oath given .. . as a witness upon a
trial."). Section 201(d) allows the payment of witness fees provided by law. See 18
U.S.C. § 201(d). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from
offering "an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.4(b) (1994). The comment to the Rule states that it is
"improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying" but "it is not improper
to pay a witness's expenses." Id. at Rule 3.4(b) cmt.
141. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1129; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1988) (It is not
illegal to pay expert witnesses "a reasonable fee for time spent in preparation of such
opinion, and in appearing and testifying."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.4(b) cmt. (1994) ("[fit is not improper . . . to compensate an expert witness on
terms permitted by law."). The payment of experts is not only the rule, it is often at
exorbitant rates. See supra note 19.
142. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.4(b) cmt. (1994).
143. See J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS
460 (1983) ("An expert who is paid only upon a favorable verdict may be induced to
give stronger or more positive testimony than he or she otherwise would give.").
144. Gross, supra note 2, at 1131; Graham, supra note 12, at 44. The Fifth Circuit
in particular has recognized the bias presented by professional experts. In Eymard
the Fifth Circuit warned that the professional expert, who "spends substantially all of
his time consulting with attorneys and testifying" may be one indication of an "expert
whose opinions are available to the highest bidder." Eymard v. Pan American World
Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234. That kind of expert, the Court concluded, should not
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witness is highly motivated out of self interest to develop re-
lationships with lawyers because those relationships are the
expert's lifeblood. The more effective the expert is in advancing
the lawyer's case, the greater the likelihood the expert will be
retained again. 45
Money also poses a problem for other experts, such as the
professor who supplements her income by testifying as an ex-
pert occasionally, 45 or the doctor who testifies periodically in
medical malpractice cases." These experts find that they can
make substantial amounts of money consulting. They, too, suc-
cumb to the circumstances and testify to conclusions more de-
finitive than they would typically assert, or they shade their
be allowed to testify. Id.
145. See Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ill. 1988) (upholding cross exami-
nation of expert witness about how much the expert made annually from services
related to rendering expert testimony). In Trower, the Illinois Supreme Court de-
scribed the expert's financial incentive as follows:
[M]e reach our decision based on an appreciation of the fact that the
financial advantage which accrues to an expert witness in a particular
case can extend beyond the remuneration he receives for testifying in
that case. A favorable verdict may well help him establish a "track re-
cord" which, to a professional witness, can be all-important in determin-
ing not only the frequency with which he is asked to testify but also the
price which he can demand for such testimony.
Id.
146. See Eymard, 795 F.2d at 1234 (noting the court's experience wherein such
professors "present studies and express opinions that they might not be willing to
express in an article submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other
contexts subject to peer review.").
One lawyer has described the problem this way: "You get a professor who
earns $60,000 a year and give him the opportunity to make a couple of hundred
thousand dollars in his spare time and he will jump at the chance. They are like a
bunch of hookers in June." Blake Fleetwood, From The People Who Brought You The
Twinkie Defense: The Rise of The Expert Witness Industry, WASH. MONTHLY, June
1987, at 33, 35-36 (quoting Dennis Roberts, an Oakland criminal defense and person-
al injury lawyer).
147. See Kirby v. Ahmad, 635 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1994) (In
medical malpractice case in which doctor charged $500 an hour for an in-office depo-
sition ($750 if the deposition was videotaped), the court concluded that "the Hippo-
cratic Oath has been supplanted by opportunism and greed by those who participate
as medical expert witnesses."); see SPENCE, supra note 2, at 270 ("[S]ome medical
school professors I know make several times their annual salary by selling testimony
to anyone who will retain them.").
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opinion in favor of their client.' In fact, no expert is immune
from the bias that comes with compensation.
49
The structure of the adversary system itself contributes to
the pervasive existence of bias. The parties and their lawyers
are solely responsible for the investigation and development of
their claim or defense.' First, the advocates select their ex-
perts. This selection is not based upon the most knowledgeable
or the most respected in the field, although lawyers certainly
seek well-credentialed experts.'5 ' Rather, lawyers shop for ex-
perts, ultimately choosing the one that talks right, looks right,
has the right credentials, and will work with the lawyer in the
development of her opinions.'52 Thus, "[a] fool with a small
148. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REv. 823, 835 (1985) Langbein describes his experiences as an expert witness in
similar terms:
I sometimes serve as an expert in trust and pension cases, and I have
experienced the subtle pressures to join the team-to shade one's views,
to conceal doubt, to overstate nuance, to downplay weak aspects of the
case that one has been hired to bolster. Nobody likes to disappoint a
patron; and beyond this psychological pressure is the financial induce-
ment.
Id.
149. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1188.
150. Professor Gross, in his very insightful article on expert witnesses, carefully
and thoroughly describes the effect of the adversary system on the selection of expert
testimony. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1126-36.
151. See id. at 1130. Nor is selection based primarily on whether the expert's
opinions are "right". Id. at 1134. "The confident expert witness is less likely to have
been chosen because she is right, than to have been chosen because she is confident,
whether or not she is right." Id.
152. See SPENCE, supra note 2, at 270 (claiming that expert witnesses "are not
chosen for their knowledge but for their ability to persuade."); Graham, supra note
12, at 85-86; Gross, supra note 2, at 1130; Shuman, supra note 19, at 201-02. The
study by Champagne, Shuman and Whitaker surveyed 215 lawyers from Baltimore,
Seattle, and Tucson who were involved in the trials studied and 30% of them re-
sponded (a total of 65 responses). Id. at 197-98 & n.11. An overwhelming majority of
the lawyers who responded considered the expert's credentials 88%, the adamancy of
the expert's support for the lawyer's position 84%, and the fee charged by the expert
747 in selecting experts. Over half of the lawyers considered the physical appearance
of the expert. Moreover, 65% of the lawyers believed that experts were willing to be
coached about how their testimony should be presented. Id. at 202. Of course, the
results of the study are not definitive because of the relatively small sample. Never-
theless, in a previous study by the same researchers (involving trials in Dallas, Tex-
as), only 7% of the lawyers questioned said that they considered the impartiality of
the expert when employing experts. Champagne, supra note 19, at 8.
Trial practice journals bear out the findings of this research. See, e.g., Gerson
H. Smoger, Using Experts Wisely in Toxic Tort Cases, 29 TRIAL, Sept. 1993, at 30-32.
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flair for acting and mathematics might be a more successful
witness than, say, Einstein."'53 In two recent studies almost
half of the lawyers questioned admitted to shopping for ex-
perts.'54 In one of the studies, eighty-six percent of the law-
yers identified the adamancy of the expert's support for the
party's position as important or very important in selecting an
expert. 5
5
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly encourage
shopping for experts by protecting from disclosure and discovery
the identity or opinions of "consulting experts."'56 Thus, not
only can a party retain experts without knowing the expert's
opinions and do so without risk of having to tell the other side
Ms. Smoger advises lawyers about how to find experts for toxic tort cases and how to
ensure that the expert is effective. The keys to choosing the best expert include:
1. review the expert's publications;
2. contact other attorneys the expert worked with;
3. confirm board certifications;
4. inquire about the expert's direct experience with the chemical in
question;
5. find out how the expert's time will be billed;
6. meet with the prospective experts and evaluate their ability to
perform in the courtroom;
7. consider whether you and the expert will be able to maintain a
smooth working relationship (for future collaborations);
8. make sure the expert is comfortable using whatever "magic
words" are required in the jurisdiction where the case will be tried.
Id. at 30.
The expert's ability to communicate effectively is a critical factor for lawyers.
See JAMES W. JEANS, SR., TRIAL ADVOCACY 388 (1993) (The expert "must be able to
express his esoteric knowledge in simple terms"); LUBET, supra note 49, at 187-88;
Champagne, supra note 19, at 8 (noting that experts themselves placed extreme im-
portance on "the ability to convey technical information in a nontechnical fashion and
the willingness to draw firm conclusions.").
153. SPENCE, supra note 2, at 270.
154. See Shuman, supra note 19, at 202 (Forty-three percent of the lawyers re-
sponding "acknowledged that they shopped for experts. They interviewed several ex-
perts before deciding whom to retain."); Champagne, supra note 19, at 7 (Forty-nine
percent of the responding lawyers interviewed several experts before making the deci-
sion to employ one.").
155. Champagne, supra note 19, at 7.
156. See FED. R. Civ. PRO. 26(b)(4)(B) (Expert "who is not expected to be called as
a witness at trial" may be discovered only upon "a showing of exceptional circum-
stances."); Robert S. Thompson, Decision, Disciplined Inferences and the Adversary
Process, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 725, 775 (1991) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(B) encourages "shopping for the 'right expert.'"). A "consulting" expert is one
not expected to testify at trial who has either been specially retained or informally
contacted by the lawyer. See FED. R. ClV. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
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about it, but a party may also employ experts to prevent the
other side from using them.
15 7
Moreover, shopping for experts has never been easier than it
is today. The prevalence of expert referral systems gives law-
yers almost limitless hiring opportunities.'58 Multiple experts
can be conveniently screened by the lawyer with little cost or
effort, guaranteeing that the lawyer is certain to ultimately find
one who will support the lawyer's position.'59
Lawyers do not shop for an expert every time they need one.
Instead, lawyers frequently retain the same expert or firm to
testify in every case that involves a particular subject matter or
a certain issue. Experts often have well-developed reputations
as a plaintiff's or defendant's expert, which lawyers perpetu-
ate.
60
Regardless of how attorneys find their experts, however, they
must prepare the expert to testify. 161 In fact, the amount of
preparation needed for experts is greater than for lay witnesses
because experts typically do not have personal knowledge of the
events at issue.6 2 Thorough preparation of experts is essential
to make the testimony clear and direct. 63 The danger present-
ed by expert witnesses, unlike the typical lay witness, is that
experts have a financial interest in thorough preparation be-
cause they are paid for their time and they want to perform
157. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1125.
158. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
159. See Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Ill. 1988) (There has been a "pro-
liferation of expert locator' services which, as a practical matter, can help the liti-
gants of either side of most any case find an expert who will help advocate the de-
sired position.").
160. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1132-33.
161. See Richard A- Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL. U. L.
REv. 757, 759 (1992). Epstein notes that this "coaching" is not only expensive, but
also "increases the risk of bias." Id. Although lawyers prepare lay witnesses to testify
as well, there are critical differences between the two. Lay witnesses usually know
certain facts that are not subject to such manipulation or at least are within the
witness's and not the lawyer's control. Experts create evidence. Lay witnesses typical-
ly have no incentive or motivation to prepare extensively. Experts are paid for their
time and are motivated by the desire for future employment. Gross, supra note 2, at
1126-29.
162. See John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 295 (1989)
(stating that experts require "considerable preparation" because they lack personal
knowledge).
163. Id. at 296 (claiming that experts are unable to testify without preparation).
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well so they will get hired again." Lawyers use their power
of preparation to shape the expert's opinions. The lawyer de-
cides what information the expert receives, what issues the
expert testifies about, and, in some instances, the words the
expert uses in stating her opinions.'65
The corrupting influence of money6 makes the lawyer's
control of selection and preparation of experts a part of the
problem." 7 Experts are selected for their witness skills and
predilections, and become paid advocates for the party,"
members of the trial team who assist in preparation of the case
and argue the party's position through their testimony at trial.
This role is expected today and is facilitated, and even encour-
aged, by the liberal Rules of Evidence.
Experts do shade their opinions,'69 overstate the certainty of
164. Gross, supra note 2, at 1146. Professor Gross has previously identified these
twin financial incentives:
Since the expert is paid she can afford to spend time preparing to testi-
fy. . . . If the expert values the role of witness . . . she will have an
additional motive to spend time working with the attorney who calls her:
careful preparation and close collaboration are likely to increase the satis-
faction of that attorney, and to make the expert more desirable as a
witness in the future.
Id. at 1138 Recent research suggests two additional points: 45% of lawyers in one
study admitted that if the expert is willing to be biased in favor of the lawyer's
position, the lawyer is inclined to employ the expert in the future. Champagne, supra
note 19, at 7. Two-thirds of the lawyers responding to the Shuman study said they
regularly retain the same expert. Shuman, supra note 19, at 202.
165. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1145-46; Shuman, supra note 19, at 202 (showing
that 65% of the lawyers responding to the study believed experts were willing to be
coached about how testimony should be presented); Champagne, supra note 19, at 7
(demonstrating that 77% of lawyers believed experts were willing to be coached).
166. The lure of money has long been recognized as a powerful influence leading
to illegal, unethical, and immoral conduct. See United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119,
124 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that participation in a drug trafficking scheme was done
for "the love of money"); Lewis v. State, 414 So. 2d 470, 475 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)
(showing that the defendant committed robbery for "the love of money"); Bushman v.
State Bar of Cal., 522 P.2d 312, 314 (Cal. 1974) (suspending lawyer from practice for
charging client an unconscionable fee); see also I Timothy 6:10 (New International)
("[Tihe love of money is the root of all kinds of evil.").
167. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1146. ("The possibility of improper influence is
inherent in adversarial preparation of all witnesses" but "experts are far easier to
manipulate than lay witnesses.").
168. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
169. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1138 (describing how process of selection and
preparation of experts causes the expert "to compromise accuracy to achieve clarity");
cf. Langbein, supra note 148, at 835-36 (stating that personal experience as an expert
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their opinions, 70 use unreliable methodologies or rely on un-
proven theories, 7' serve as conduits of inadmissible evi-
dence'72  and occasionally lie 73  in the service of their
included "subtle pressures to . . . shade one's views").
170. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Cau-
sation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1993) (In the Bendectin litiga-
tion (described in some detail infra at text accompanying notes 230-51) the expert
witnesses "expressed little uncertainty as to whether Bendectin is or is not a terato-
gen" despite the fact that scientific research did not definitively show any casual
connection between Bendectin and limb reduction defects.); Cf Champagne, supra note
19, at 7 (Fifty-six percent of lawyers responding to study "urged experts to be less
tentative in their testimony.").
171. See Eymard v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230 (1986). In
Eymard the expert economist for the children of decedent Ted Eymard testified to
Mr. Eymard's future income (if he had lived) and the collective loss of inheritance for
the three children. Id. at 1232-33. In rendering his opinions, however, the economist
made assumptions that the Fifth Circuit found were "unsupported" and "completely
incredible" and based his calculations on principles that were "inappropriate" and
ignored reality. Id. at 1234-35. As a result, the court overturned the jury's damage
award for loss of inheritance as "speculative or purely conjectural" and lectured trial
judges on the need to be more vigilant in dealing with experts. Id. at 1235.
Similarly unreliable was the expert testimony offered by plaintiffs' experts in
Sorenson v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 1994). The experts opined that "be-
cause [the children] sustained birth defects ... and their parents used Shaklee's
alfalfa tablets, and because some alfalfa tablets had contained an EtO residue, the
parents must have ingested the EtO residue tablets." Id. at 649. The appellate court
noted with incredulity the experts' final inference, which essentially "reasoned from a
final result in order to hypothesize what needed to be known but what was not." Id.;
see E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Robinson, No. 94-0843, 1995 WL 359024
(Tex. June 15, 1995) (excluding expert testimony based in part on faulty methodology
"similar to that condemned by the court in Sorenson").
For another example of an unproven theory that found its way into the court-
room, see United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 752-54 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing
an astronomer to testify at trial, without objection, that he could date a photograph
by making certain calculations from the "directional angle of the shadow cast by [an]
object," despite the fact that no one had ever used his theory to date a photograph
before and his theory had never been published, verified, or corroborated); see also
HUBER supra note 12, at 37 passim (describing numerous examples of the admission
of unreliable evidence); infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text (discussing unreli-
able expert testimony in Bendectin cases).
172. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
173. See Ladner v. Higgins, 71 So. 2d 242, 244 (La. Ct. App. 1954). In Ladner, the
defendant's medical expert gave one of the most candid, if not most blatant, examples
of false testimony. The exchange at trial, as reported by the court of appeals, was as
follows:
Q.: Is that your conclusion that this man is a malingerer?
A.: I wouldn't be testifying if I didn't think so, unless I was on the other
side, then it would be a post traumatic condition.
Id. Undoubtedly, testimonial lies from experts are the exception and not the rule, for
several reasons. For one, the nature of expert testimony is to render opinions, not to
state facts. Thus, outright lies are difficult to identify and most "opinions" are subject
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clients. 74 The financial incentive, when combined with the
process of selection and preparation, is significant enough that
even the most honorable expert is placed in a difficult dilemma.
The problem of bias is a serious one.'75 However, the legal
conventional wisdom is that the system can adequately deal
with the problem.'76 The adversary system, including cross ex-
amination, presentation of conflicting evidence, and jury in-
structions, should reveal the expert's bias and provide the jury
with the information needed to properly evaluate the testimo-
ny.'77 Too often, however, the bias of the paid expert is large-
ly immune from the safeguards of our adversary system, and,
left unchecked, threatens to undermine the system's pursuit of
truth and justice. 8 This threat exists because the paid parti-
san operates under such liberal rules of evidence and testifies
before an ill-equipped lay jury. These concerns are discussed be-
low.
to interpretation. Moreover, lawyers much prefer experts who truly believe in their
position (however far out of the mainstream). Gross, supra, note 2, at 1132, 1177.
Nevertheless, egregious and disturbing examples of widespread fraud by expert wit-
nesses have been reported with disturbing frequency. One example is the pathologist
for about 40 counties in Texas who falsified autopsies and then testified about the
false reports in court. Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (1993).
174. See Graham, supra note 12, at 45 ("[Plracticing lawyers can locate quickly
and easily an expert witness to advocate nearly anything the lawyers desire" or "al-
most anything the client desires."); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony,
20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986) (concluding that "[a]n expert can be found to
testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous.").
175. See HUBER, supra note 12, at 17-20; Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control
Over Expert Testimony: Of Deference and Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REv 1156, 1162-63
(1993) ("[Tlhe close working relationship between experts and their clients threatens
objectivity and neutrality, resulting in serious damage to the trial system."); Gross,
supra note 2, at 1146.
176. See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1131, 1146 (1993) (arguing that cross
examination can fully reveal the extent of the expert's bias and that "it would be
evidence of remarkable and disqualifying stupidity" if the jury was unable to under-
stand the point).
177. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
178. See Epstein, supra note 175, at 1162-63.
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B. The (Un)Safeguards of the Adversary System
The adversary system can be distinguished from other sys-
tems of adjudication by its heavy reliance on the parties to
investigate and present their claims or defenses, and on a pas-
sive decision-maker to render a verdict.79 Two parties, pitted
against each other in "legal combat,"80 are motivated to pres-
ent their best case and to vigorously attack the other side's
evidence, providing the impartial factfinder with all the infor-
mation needed to decide the matter appropriately.'' If the
system works, the outcome is a just and true verdict.'82
The system, however, does not always work." The adver-
sary system turns expert testimony into a sport'" rather than
a search for the truth. The truth-seeking tools of the system,
including the presentation of contrary evidence and cross exam-
ination, serve only to mask the truth" and create uncer-
179. See Ellen F. Sward, Values, Ideology & the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 IND. L.J. 301, 302, 313 (1989) (contrasting party control and passive decision-mak-
er aspects of adversary system with inquisitorial systems that emphasize judicial
control over investigation, presentation, and decision-making).
180. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 54 (1991) (describing the adver-
sary system as "legal combat").
181. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("[Vlery premise of ad-
versary system is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote
the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."); Smith
v. Armontrout, 632 F. Supp. 503, 508 n.9 (W.D. Mo. 1986) ("The adversary system is
based upon the idea that, in an open forum where each party is allowed to present
its own information and test the other's information, the %ruth' will rise to the sur-
face."); Applegate, supra note 162, at 326 (asserting that the adversary theory of
factfinding presupposes that the truth will best be found by the clash of two or more
versions of reality before a neutral tribunal); Sward, supra note 179, at 316-17 (When
each side presents its best case in the adversary system, the decision-maker has all
the information it needs to reach a just result.).
182. See Paul L. Haines, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judi-
cial Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445, 447 (1990) (arguing that the adversary system is a
means of discerning truth and justice); Sward, supra note 183, at 304-05 (stating that
truth and justice are important aspects of the adversary system). Of course, "truth"
cannot be known with absolute certainty. Smith v. Armontrout, 632 F. Supp. 503, 508
n.9 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Sward, supra note 179, at 304 (stating that "truth is elusive").
183. See Zacharias, supra note 180, at 55 (arguing that the adversary system does
not always expose truth).
184. See generally Judith L. Maute, Note, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Ad-
versary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7, 30 (1987) (dis-
cussing the positive and negative dimensions of litigation as a game or sport).
185. See Sward, supra note 179, at 317 (alleging that the adversary system en-
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tainty. The jury as the factfinder finds itself lost, isolated, and
helpless.
1. The Lay Jury
Almost a century ago Justice Learned Hand recognized the
limitations of the lay jury. He concluded that in resolving con-
flicts or inconsistencies in expert testimony "[t]he jury is not a
competent tribunal."8 ' In fact, "[i]t is just because they are
incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at
all."'87 Hand based his conclusion on the fact that a jury lacks
the experience necessary to understand the validity of the laws
or propositions used by the experts." Hand considered the
problem intractable, causing him to propose the widespread use
of court appointed experts who would provide the jury "the final
statement of what was true."'89 Therein lies the age old co-
nundrum: how can the system give the jury the assistance it
needs to resolve conflicts in expert testimony without over-
whelming the jury with conflicting advice that it cannot compe-
tently evaluate?
a. The Supreme Court's View of the Jury
Unfortunately, there is no obvious solution to the problem.
The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc.,"' gave a two part response to the dilemma. First, it im-
posed gatekeeper responsibilities on the judge, requiring the
exclusion of opinions based on unreliable methodologies or theo-
ries.' 9' Second, it relied on the adversary system to give the
courages litigants to "mask" the truth).
186. See Hand, supra note 96, at 54-55.
187. Id. at 54.
188. Id. The fundamental and insurmountable problem for juries, in Hand's opin-
ion, was that the truth of a proposition relied on by an expert "lies just in its validi-
ty as an inference from a vast mass of experience .... Knowledge of such general
laws can be acquired only from a specialized experience such as the ordinary man
does not possess." Id. at 55.
189. Id. at 56. Hand's other equally compelling concern was "that the expert be-
comes a hired champion of one side." See id. at 53.
190. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
191. Id. at 2798.
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jury the aid necessary to resolve expert conflicts. 92 The Court
expressed its belief that skeptics of jury competence are "overly
pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury, and of the adver-
sary system generally."193
The Court, however, is apparently more pessimistic about
juries and the adversary system than it was when it decided
Barefoot v. Estelle'" in 1983. In Barefoot, the Court held that
a criminal defendant's due process rights were not violated by
the admission of psychiatric opinion testimony about the
defendant's future dangerousness.'95 This ruling was contrary
to the available data, which indicated that "psychiatrists and
psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three
predictions of violent behavior."9 ' The Court was confident
that the adversary system would sort out the reliable evidence
from the unreliable, and that the jury would take due account
of the shortcomings of the evidence.'97
In Daubert, on the other hand, the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized that trusting juries with unreliable expert testimony
is unwise, and thus imposed a reliability requirement on scien-
tific expert testimony that predictions of future dangerousness
may well not satisfy.' Justice Blackmun, who wrote the
Court's opinion in Daubert, and scolded Merrell Dow's lawyers
192. Id.
193. Id. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court reached the same
conclusion in a different context. In Barefoot, the Court addressed the admission of
expert testimony by psychiatrists predicting a person's future dangerousness and
concluded that the testimony should be admitted. Its weight could be determined by
the fact finder who had the benefit of observing cross examination and contrary evi-
dence presented by the opposing party. Id. at 898.
194. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
195. Id. at 896-903.
196. Id. at 898 n.7. The American Psychiatric Association filed an amicus brief in
which it stated its opposition to the prediction of future dangerousness by psychia-
trists. Id. at 899. The Court noted that some members of the Association expressly
disagreed with the Association's position. Id.
197. Id. at 899, 901. In addition, the Court noted that predictions of dangerousness
by lay persons are admissible and "it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psy-
chiatrists . . .would know so little about the subject that they should not be permit-
ted to testify." Id. at 896-97.
198. Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 1999, 2021 (1994). Professor Giannelli is more bold. He says:
"[Elven a superficial reliability analysis should result in the exclusion of [the testimo-
ny from Barefoot]." Id.
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(and others) for their skepticism about the jury,9 ' dissented
in Barefoot and recognized the danger of admitting unreliable
expert testimony."' He stated: "unreliable scientific evidence
is widely acknowledged to be prejudicial" and "the prejudice is
likely to be indelible." s'O In language reminiscent of Judge
Learned Hand, Blackmun observed: "One can only wonder how
juries are to separate valid from invalid expert opinions when
the "experts" themselves are so obviously unable to do so."" 2
b. In the Jury We Trust?
As Hand and the Supreme Court in Barefoot and Daubert so
clearly demonstrate, one's perception of the jury's capability to
competently weigh expert witness testimony is often at the
heart of any attempt to reform expert witness testimony or
change the standard for admitting such testimony. In Daubert,
the Court ended Frye's reign based on the belief that cross
examination, contrary evidence, and instructions from the judge
were sufficient tools to allow the jury to evaluate expert testi-
mony competently."0 3 The Frye general acceptance test is ap-
plied by courts because of the belief that scientific evidence
takes on an "aura of special reliability" that may mislead the
jury.2"' Commentators follow the same path: Those who mis-
199. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
200. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 926-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The record in Barefoot supported
Justice Blackmun's concerns, suggesting that psychiatrists are accurate only one out
of three times when predicting future dangerousness. 463 U.S. at 899 n.7 (citing
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981)). Blackmun
concluded that "[t]here can be no question that psychiatric predictions of future vio-
lence will have an undue effect on the ultimate verdict." 463 U.S. at 929. The Court,
while characterizing Blackmun's dissent as premised on the jury's inability to sepa-
rate the wheat from the chaff, stated: "We do not share in this low evaluation of the
adversary process." Id. at 899 n.7.
202. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 929; see supra notes 186-89 (discussing Judge Learned
Hand's remarks on jury incompetence).
203. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
204. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128 (1991) (fol-
lowing Frye because expert opinion based on a scientific technique "create[s] a sub-
stantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the
jury . .. because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness') (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)), vacated and remanded,
113 S. Ct. at 2798 (1993); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.
1975) (stating that scientific evidence "is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near
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trust the jury's competence seek tighter control over expert
testimony;. 5 those who believe the jury is capable of evaluat-
ing expert testimony propose maintaining the liberal Federal
Rules, or, at most, changing the presentation of evidence, but
not the standard for admission."8
This relationship between the standard for admitting and
excluding expert testimony and the testimony's perceived effect
on the jury should not come as a surprise. At the core of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is the premise that evidence that
poses a significant danger of confusing, overwhelming or other-
wise distracting the jury from its factfinding should be exclud-
ed.2"' The rule against hearsay is perhaps the most prominent
example of this principle.0 8 The rule excludes out of court
statements offered for their truth subject to numerous excep-
tions,2" out of concern that the jury will fail to give hearsay
statements the appropriate weight.210 In more general terms,
Rule 403 embodies this premise, specifically excluding evidence
when the risk that the jury will decide a case based on emotion
instead of the facts is substantially greater than the probative
infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi"); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d
741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that scientific evidence may "assume a posture of
mythic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen"); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321
(Cal. 1994) ("[Llay jurors tend to give considerable weight to scientific evidence when
presented by experts with impressive credentials: . . . [A] misleading aura of certain-
ty . . . often envelopes a new scientific process.").
205. E.g., Epstein, supra note 175, at 1157-58; David L. Faigman, Struggling to
Stop the Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877, 886 (1992).
206. E.g., Weinstein, supra note 174, at 482.
207. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
208. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). Rule 801(c) provides: "'Iearsay' is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Id.
209. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d), 803, and 804.
210. See 2 JoNES ON EVIDENCE, supra note 63, at 168 (arguing that the hearsay
rule was developed for jury trials because of a distrust for juries based on jurors'
lack of training to discriminate between different grades of testimony); JAMES B.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 517-23 (1898);
Faigman, supra note 205, at 879-80 ("The drafters of the Rules simply did not trust
juries to appreciate the limited weight hearsay should receive."). But see Richard F.
Rakos & Stephen Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, Gen-
eral Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REV. 655, 658-63 (1992) (suggesting
that initial research does not support historical premise for excluding hearsay).
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value of the evidence. 1 Clearly, jury competence is and
should be a fundamental issue of evidentiary reform.212
Remarkably, the debate over expert witness testimony has
been argued without much reference to reliable information
about the jury.213 Instead, commentators have often relied on
2215personal experience,2 14  intuition, and anecdotal
evidence,216 rather than empirical research.1 7 Of course, it
does not take the assistance of empirical data to know that
jurors are ill-equipped to understand complex expert testimony.
That is a matter of common sense.15 On the other hand, re-
search can shed light on the extent to which the jLu's limita-
tions cause inconsistent or inaccurate decision-making. Unfortu-
211. Rule 403 precludes the admission of evidence when the "probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 403. Most
notably, Rule 403 covers evidence with "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis [such as] an emotional one." FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's
note.
212. See Edward J. Imwinlderied, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence:
A Critique From the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 564 (1982-
83) (arguing that in situations in which a jury is not able to critically evaluate scien-
tific testimony, liberal admission of the testimony would be a miscarriage of justice).
213. See Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases In-
volving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data From Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY
L.J. 885, 886 (1994) (noting that many commentators have relied on anecdotal evi-
dence to support claim that juries are incompetent); J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah
Tanford, Better Science Through Trials: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collabora-
tion, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 753-54 (1988) (noting failure of lawyers to distinguish
between 'pop psychology' and scientific research on the jury).
214. See, e.g., Irving Younger, A Practical Approach to the Use of Expert Testimo-
ny, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 39 (1982) (concluding that in his experience jurors are
competent to assess the credibility of experts).
215. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 205, at 882 (relying on intuition to conclude
that juries cannot critically assess scientific evidence); Gianelli, supra note 106, at
1237 (stating that the major danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead
the jury, but failing to cite any study or research to support his point); Hand, supra
note 96, at 55-56 (concluding without citing to any authority that the jury is not
competent to resolve conflicts in expert testimony).
216. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 12, at 20 passim (describing numerous anecdotes
of alleged "junk science" that misled juries to illustrate the problem); Vidmar, supra
note 213, at 886-87 (describing use of anecdotal evidence by Huber and others).
217. There are some notable exceptions of course. For a discussion of empirical
data on jury competence see Imwinkleried, supra note 212, at 564-70; Steven M.
Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical
Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1776-77 (1986).
218. Imwinkleried, supra note 212, at 564 ("[Clommon sense suggests that lay ju-
rors with little or no background in science will have difficulty understanding com-
plex, technical testimony.").
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nately, most, if not all, of the available research is equivocal
and does not support general conclusions about the jury.219
The reasons for the limitations are varied. First, until recent-
ly, much of the research in this area has been narrowly focused
on expert testimony about eyewitness testimony and polygraph
examinations. Second, many of the available studies are
"simulations" in that they involve simulated jurors, simulated
cases, or both.' Thus, the results may not generalize to real
jurors in real cases. Third, the studies rarely include group
deliberations or verdicts so that the practical effect of the testi-
mony can be measured.222 Fourth, studies that involve actual
cases and juries are typically small and must rely on post-trial
interviews of the jury to evaluate jury competence. Not surpris-
ingly, most jurors believe they understand the testimony presented.'
219. Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Sci-
entific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity," 25
CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1094, 1097 (1993) ("[Tlhe import of [the empirical data] is unde-
niably equivocal."); Gross, supra note 2 at 1179 (stating that the data on jury behav-
ior may have limited "generalizability").
220. Gross, supra note 2, at 1179.
221. See, e.g., Jane Goodman, Jurors' Comprehension and Assessment of
Probabilistic Evidence, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 368-69 (1992) (using mock jurors
and written case summary); Ann Cavoukian & Ronald J. Keslegrave, The Admissibili-
ty of Polygraph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
117, 124-25 (1980) (using mock jurors and a written description of a murder case);
Ronald L. Carlson et al., The Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on Jury Deliberations:
An Empirical Study, 5 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMN. 148, 150 (1977) (using mock jurors).
222. See Tanford & Tanford, supra note 213, at 754-55 ("[T]he effect of a manipu-
lation on actual jurors cannot be predicted without considering the deliberation pro-
cess.").
223. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL 14-17 (1988) (noting weaknesses of research involving review of court records,
interviewing jurors or interviewing other trial participants). Kassin and Wrightsman
observe that reviewing court records or interviewing jurors does not allow the re-
searcher to draw firm conclusions about cause and effect. Moreover, the reliability of
juror interviews depend on the ability and willingness of the jurors to disclose truth-
ful information. Id.
The groundbreaking study of juries by Kalven and Zeisel in which actual trials
were studied and actual jurors were interviewed, is often cited as proof that jurors do
not overvalue expert testimony. E.g., Imwinkleried, supra note 212, at 566-67 (stating
that the findings of Kalven and Zeisel that jurors adequately follow the evidence and
understand the case, and that a jury's verdict moves with the weight and direction of
the evidence "are highly relevant because many of the cases they studied involved
scientific evidence"). Yet, the trials studied occurred in 1954-55 and 1958, expert
witness testimony was given in only 25% of the prosecution cases and 6% of the
criminal defense cases, and both sides presented expert testimony in only 3% of the
cases. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, JR., THE AMERICAN JURY 33 n.1 & 139 (1966).
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Nevertheless, many of the commentators who have reviewed
the available "equivocal" data have concluded that juries are
competent to evaluate expert testimony," or at least are no
worse with expert evidence than with any other evidence they
evaluate.2 5 However, there is also a body of research that
supports the opposite conclusion."' The Special Committee on
Jury Comprehension of the American Bar Association's Litiga-
tion Section, which studied four complex trials, found that
many jurors were "out of their league," and that in a six week
trial involving misappropriation of trade secrets the jury had a
difficult time understanding and evaluating the evidence.227
Perhaps most interesting is that alternate juries used by the
Committee reached different verdicts from the actual juries in
three of the four cases."' In addition, there is substantial re-
search concluding that jurors do not competently evaluate sta-
tistical evidence. 9
Thus, the study is not particularly revealing about how juries handle the now-com-
mon battle of the experts or the more sophisticated expert testimony presented in
courtrooms in 1995. See Joe S. Cecil, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Les-
sons From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 747-48 (1991).
224. See Cecil, supra note 224, at 764 ("[T]he overall picture of the jury that
emerges from the available data indicates that juries are capable of deciding even
very complex cases."); Gross, supra note 2, at 1179 ("[Tjhe limited experimental data
on jury behavior do not support the view that jurors attribute a 'mystic infallibility'
to expert evidence."); Imwinkleried, supra note 212, at 566-71 (concluding that there
is little or no objective support for position that jurors attach too much weight to
expert testimony); Jacobs, supra note 221, at 1097 (stating that available empirical
data "strongly rebuts the broad assumption that jurors are not competent to under-
stand complicated scientific evidence."); Vidmar, supra note 213, at 907 (finding that
data supports the conclusion that in the preponderance of medical malpractice cases
jurors "make reasonable decisions").
225. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1180.
226. See Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22,
1993, at S-4. A poll of nearly 800 people who served on civil or criminal juries in
1992 found that 89% of the jurors polled thought the expert witnesses who testified
were believable. Moreover, 36% thought the expert testimony "made a great deal of
difference" and 32% said it "made some difference" in their case. For additional ma-
terial see ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYsTEM: A
CASE STUDY 85-86 (concluding that juries in two complex cases did not understand
economic testimony); Egesdal, supra note 217, at 1776-77.
227. Special Comm. on Jury Comprehension, Jury Comprehension in Complex Cas-
es, 1989 A.B.A_ SEC. LITIG. 25. The other cases involved sexual harassment, antitrust,
and insurance fraud. Id. at 9.
228. Id. at 59.
229. Jacobs, supra note 219, at 1096 ("Understanding and evaluating statistical
evidence, for example, seems to present real difficulties to most ordinary jurors.").
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The most revealing research, however, is the recent work
done by Professor Joseph Sanders on the Bendectin litiga-
tion.23 The issue in every Bendectin case was the same: Did
the anti-nausea drug Bendectin cause limb reduction defects in
newborn children? 3' More than a thousand lawsuits were
filed against the manufacturer of Bendectin, Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.232 Twenty-five of the cases were tried to a
jury, and verdicts were returned in twenty.33
It is generally recognized by scientists that Bendectin does
not cause limb reduction defects in newborn children.23 Yet,
plaintiffs presented highly credentialed expert witnesses at each
trial 5 who testified under oath that based upon in vivo and
in vitro studies, pharmacological structural analysis, and re-
analyses of epidemiological data, Bendectin can cause limb
reduction defects in newborn children.236 Defendants also of-
230. See generally Sanders, supra note 170, at 4-12 (overviewing the Bendectin
litigation). The terms "Bendectin litigation' or "Bendectin cases" are used interchange-
ably in this article to describe a series of cases involving claims by plaintiffs of limb
reduction defects caused by the ingestion of Bendectin by the mother during pregnan-
cy. Professor Joseph Sanders has studied the Bendectin litigation extensively, see id.
at 3-5, and the data he has collected and written about is referred to at some length
in this section of the article. Sanders interviewed the jurors in one Bendectin case,
Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in which a large verdict was returned
for the plaintiff, reviewed transcripts from a total of six Bendectin trials, and cor-
related the outcomes in every case tried to a verdict. See id. at 30.
231. Sanders, supra note 170, at 5 ("Each trial involved the same fundamental
question: Did Bendectin cause birth defects?"); see, e.g., Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2788;
Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 959 F.2d 1349, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1992)
(noting inconsistent results reached on causation issue); De Luca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 943 (3rd Cir. 1990) (noting existence of over 1000
suits alleging Bendectin caused birth defects).
232. See De Luca, 911 F.2d at 943 ("This is one of the last of over 1,000 suits
alleging that birth defects were caused by the drug Bendectin."); Sanders, supra note
170, at 4 (stating that almost 1,700 suits have been filed against Merrell Dow alleg-
ing injuries caused by Bendectin). One of the jury trials was the consolidation of 818
cases and involved only the common issue of causation. See In re Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. "Bendectin" Prod. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
233. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 4. In addition, five trials were tried to the
judge. See id. at 4-5.
234. Id. at 9-12 (The "sentiment in both scientific and judicial communities [is]
that Bendectin is not a teratogen.").
235. See id. at 32 (showing that almost all the experts possessed a Ph.D. or M.D.
and some held other advanced degrees); see also Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791 & n.2
(describing the highly credentialed experts in that case).
236. See generally Sanders, supra note 170, at 18-24 (reviewing the types of data
relied on by experts in the Bendectin cases); id. at 4-18 (describing testimony on
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fered expert testimony at each trial and presented the conven-
tional scientific position that there was no reliable evidence of
any causal connection." 7 Remarkably, the jurors found for the
plaintiffs forty percent of the time (eight out of twenty trials), a
success rate that is consistent with the success rate of plaintiffs
in products liability litigation generally."' Moreover, plaintiffs'
successes were not compressed into the early period of litigation
as one might expect; rather, they were spread consistently
throughout the litigation. 9
Professor Sanders concluded that the primary shortcoming of
the Bendectin juries was that they became "one-eyed
factfinders."240 That is, they treated all experts as similarly
qualified and all evidence of equal value and relevance."' The
jurors lacked "depth perception."24 2 The juries appeared to un-
dervalue the epidemiological evidence, overvalue other types of
available data, and misperceive the state of scientific opinion
about the causation issue.2"
The Bendectin cases help fill a vacuum of research data on
how effectively (or ineffectively) juries handle conflicting expert
testimony. The data is particularly helpful because it is based
on the results reached by real juries in real cases who listened
to real experts testify about the same issue in each case. 2" It
causation by plaintiffs' experts).
237. Id. at 42.
238. See Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After
Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387, 1433 (1994).
239. Sanders, supra note 170, at 51.
240. Id.
241. See id., at 47.
242. Id.
243. Epidemiological studies are generally considered indispensable proof in toxic
tort or mass exposure cases. In the Bendectin cases, defendants presented evi-
dence, which plaintiffs could not deny, that all 30 of the extant epidemiological stud-
ies found no causal connection. Yet, one juror interviewed by Sanders ranked epide-
miology last in importance, behind test tube and animal studies and the pharmaco-
logical structural analysis. Id. at 45. Four other jurors in the same case believed
after the trial that a majority of epidemiologists considered Bendectin a teratogen or
that they were at most evenly divided. Id. at 40.
244. Cf KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 223, at 14-18 (pointing out weaknesses
of various research approaches used with juries). The normal shortcoming of relying
on court records as a basis for jury research is the inability to draw firm conclusions
about causes and effects due to the many variables involved in a trial. Id. at 14-15.
The Bendectin cases ameliorate that concern to some degree because each case in-
volved the same issue, similar injuries and similar expert testimony. See Sanders,
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is compelling data because it comports with the experience of
most people and the long held beliefs of many commentators:
when confronted with conflicting information from experts (of
whatever type) jurors choose between them by making personal
judgments.24 Because jurors are not competent to decide
which expert is "right" they use their intuition (they choose the
one they like), or decide the issue based on the perceived moti-
vations of the experts (they choose the one they believe), or
they decide the issue based on the experts' presentation or
qualifications (they choose the one who appears to be the better
expert). Alternatively, they may reject the expert advice alto-
gether and decide the issue on other considerations (they choose
the position they wanted all along or the position to which they
are emotionally attached).'
supra note 170, at 2. Accordingly, the results are more helpful than the typical study
of jury behavior that consists of mock jurors viewing a simulated case, see, e.g., Alan
Markwart & Brian E. Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Deci-
sion-Making, 7 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 324, 334 (1979), mock jurors viewing a real
trial, see, e.g., Carlson supra note 221, at 150, or mock jurors simply reading a de-
scription of a case, see, e.g., Caroukian, supra note 221, at 125. Simulated jury stud-
ies may lack "external validity." That is, they may not generalize to real trials in-
volving real juries. Kassin, supra note 223, at 18; Tanford & Tanford, supra note 213,
at 754-55. The study of the Bendectin cases does not have that weakness.
245. See, e.g., Melvin Belli, Forensic Medical Experts, Obligations and Responsibili-
ties, 8 MED. SCI. & L. 15, 19 (1968) (A juror's decision to believe one doctor over
another is likely to be based on "courtroom demeanor, personality, or forensic abili-
ty."); Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRAL, Nov.
1985, at 65 (asserting that jurors are likely to make "personal judgments about the
experts and not about the information relayed."); Sanders, supra note 170 at 38-39
(claiming that should jurors be unable to weigh expert opinion based on testimony
alone, they may look to other factors, make personal judgments about the experts);
Younger, supra note 214, at 39-42 (concluding that a jury does a good job of assess-
ing an experes credibility because jurors (1) pay attention to the expert's qualifica-
tions, (2) reject testimony that conflicts with their world view, and (3) judge the ex-
pert based on his personality, presence, and appearance).
246. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1187. Professor Gross, in his illuminating article
on expert witnesses, articulates four situations in which the jury might disregard the
evidence altogether: (1) 'jurors might choose the expert opinion that best fit their
previous predilections on the factual issue in question"; (2) they might pick one
expert's views because it leads to the outcome they prefer for other reasons; (3) they
might conclude that the expert testimony is a "wash" because one view cancels out
the other, or (4) they might deliberately disregard the evidence "out of anger, or
confusion, or disappointment." Id. (citations omitted).
One of the concerns in the Bendectin cases was that juries would be swayed by
the severe nature of the plaintiffs' injuries. See De Luca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 943, 952 (claiming that an expert testifying for plain-
tiff who was "as sympathetic as a child crippled by serious birth defects" should be
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This is disturbing because the Bendectin cases share much in
common with the typical case tried to juries today."' The bat-
tle of the experts that was present in every Bendectin case is
now commonplace. A study of 529 civil jury trials in California
found that opposing expert testimony was presented in fifty-
seven percent of all trials.2" Moreover, testifying experts are
likely to be repeat performers who testify frequently,24 9 and
tend to be well-paid25° and highly-credentialed"' Of course,
it would overstate the case to draw conclusions about jury be-
havior based on the Bendectin cases alone. These cases involved
particular sets of facts and issues that may limit their general
application. However, the Bendectin cases do suggest that the
subject to heightened scrutiny); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 857 F.2d 823,
832-33 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("It is 'imperative' in this case to remain vigilant to ensure
that neither emotion nor confusion has supplanted reason. . . . There was an emo-
tional factor at play, a circumstance we are not at liberty to ignore."), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 882 (1989). One sign of emotion prevailing over reason is the large damage
awards rendered by several juries. In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hatner, a
state court jury in Corpus Christi, Texas awarded the plaintiffs over three million
dollars in compensatory damages and thirty million dollars in punitive damages. See
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 907 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
247. There are, of course, obvious differences. The Bendectin cases involved unusu-
al injuries, focused on the causation issue, not the issue of defect or negligence, and
included an inordinately large number of expert witnesses-almost half of all the wit-
nesses called. Even to the extent the lessons from the Bendectin cases cannot be gen-
eralized to non-toxic tort litigation, see Vidmar, supra note 213, at 909, there is more
"mass exposure" litigation than ever and the lessons from those cases are clear.
248. Gross, supra note 2, at 1120. The study examined civil trials in California in
1985 and 1986. In 63% of all trials and in three quarters of cases involving expert
testimony there was some expert testimony presented by both sides. See id., at 1120.
The study also found on average of 3.3 experts testified in every trial. Id. An updat-
ed study, which examined trials in 1990-91, found 4.1 experts testified in every trial.
Samual R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Preliminary Tabulation (June 1994) (on file
with the author). In a much more recent study of trials in Seattle, Baltimore, and
Tucson a sizable majority of the judges, lawyers and experts responding stated that
in cases where expert witnesses testified, both sides presented expert testimony.
Shuman, supra note 19, at 199.
249. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1120 (showing that expert witnesses averaged 9.4
appearances in trial over six years); Shuman, supra note 19, at 204 (Ninety percent
of lawyers responding to a survey stated it was "common for lawyers to work regu-
larly with the same expert witnesses.").
250. See Champagne, supra note 19, at 6 (showing that average expert witness fee
of 42 experts regarding the study was $258); Shuman, supra note 19, at 205 (demon-
strating that the average expert witness fee of 85 experts responding to study was
$185 an hour and ranged up to $500 an hour).
251. See Gross, supra, note 2, at 1119; Shuman, supra note 19, at 204 (demon-
strating that 64% of experts in study had at least a masters degree; 54% had a doc-
torate or professional degree).
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tools of the adversary system do not demystify expert testimony
for juries; instead they may make the jury's task more difficult.
2. Cross Examination and Contrary Evidence
a. Presentation of Contrary Evidence
The adversary system provides advocates with two weapons
for waging legal combat at trial: the opportunity to present
evidence that contradicts the evidence of their adversary, and
the opportunity to cross examine their adversary's witnesses.
The problems created by the presentation of contrary evi-
dence can be demonstrated by the following example. Assume
that ninety-five experts in a particular scientific field take the
position that there is no causal connection between a substance
or device and plaintiffs injuries. Five experts disagree, and take
the position that there is a causal connection. At trial, one
expert from each side testifies. The defendant's expert testifies
that there is a clear, overwhelming majority of the scientific
community that agrees with him. The judge instructs the jury
that the number of witnesses called by the parties on an issue
is not a factor that it should consider. 2 The jury, because it
is unable to substantively evaluate the conflicting positions of
the experts, relies on conventional devices, such as bias, to
decide the issue. What will the jury decide? It may well choose
to dismiss as self-serving the defendant expert's characteriza-
tion of the scientific community, or simply be swayed by the
charm and persuasion of the plaintiffs expert. Of course, if one
side presents additional expert testimony, the other side will
too."' Thus, the first shortcoming of the presentation of con-
252. A typical instruction to the jury on this point might state as follows:
The weight of evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of
witnesses testifying on either side. You should consider all the facts and
circumstances in evidence to determine which of the witnesses are worthy
of greater credence. You may find that the testimony of a smaller num-
ber of witnesses on one side is more credible than the testimony of a
greater number of witnesses on the other side.
1 EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKIMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS 573 (3d ed. 1977).
253. Sanders, supra note 170, at 39 (assuming both sides have roughly equal re-
sources).
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trary evidence, at least with experts, is that the presentation
itself may give the jury a misleading portrayal of the relevant
scientific community.
254
Moreover, as Professor Gross has pointed out, those experts
in the minority on any issue are more likely to be in great
demand because there are fewer of them and their position is
the controversial one.255 Accordingly, they are likely to testify
more frequently, become more effective advocates for their posi-
tion, participate in litigation as a matter of principle and be
quite persuasive witnesses.25 Once again, the Bendectin cases
support this point.257
Dangers of substance arise as well. When conflicting expert
testimony is presented to a lay jury two events take place.
First, the conflicts between the experts are emphasized and the
areas of agreement are ignored or understated."8 The advoca-
cy role assumed by many experts leads directly to this problem.
Experts who are carefully prepared and selected by lawyers
testify to persuade the jury, not to inform them. The best way
for lawyer's to accomplish this goal is to focus their expert's
testimony on the critical areas of disagreement.259
Second, experts state their opinions more conclusively in the
courtroom than they do in their disciplines, and more definitive-
ly than is justified by their research.260 A confident expert
254. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1184 (giving example from psychiatry, which has
.overwhelmingly rejected the notion that they can predict future violence," yet at a
trial the jury will likely hear one expert on each side of "this fictitious divide"); Mi-
chael J. Saks & Roselle L. Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimo-
ny & Surveys of the Law and of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. Sci. 435, 438-40 (1984) ('The
search for witnesses that is driven by the advocacy process may result in a distortion
of knowledge when applied to expert witnesses.").
255. Gross, supra note 2, at 1185.
256. Id. ("[Tihe one expert who will testify to the discredited point of view is prob-
ably in greater demand as a witness, more experienced in court, and more effective.").
257. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 41.
258. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1175. Professor Gross characterizes the problems
as follows: "[D]isagreements are all but inevitable, areas of agreement are under-em-
phasized or ignored, disputes in the field are magnified, and the consensus of experts,
if any, is obscured." Id.
259. See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
260. See Champagne, supra note 19, at 7-8 (showing that 71% of experts re-
sponding believed firm conclusions were important); Sanders, supra note 170, at 37
(alleging that experts accept that it is necessary for them to "simplify their opinions"
when testifying); Shuman, supra note 19, at 202 (stating that 64% of experts re-
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who gives clear, unequivocal opinions is much more persuasive
than one who gives uncertain, tentative testimony.26' Lawyers
take great pains in preparing experts to ensure that they testi-
fy to firm conclusions, and use the liberality of Rule 704 to
have the expert deliver the opinion in terms of the ultimate
issue in the case.262 This certainty almost always comes at the
expense of accuracy inasmuch as scientific truth is almost never
known absolutely.263
Thus, the very act of presenting conflicting expert testimony
poses substantial obstacles for the jury by distorting the jury's
view of the conflict. Moreover, as Justice Blackmun observed in
his dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle, if the experts are unable to
decide the contested issue, how is the jury supposed to do
so?" The jury, unable to judge the dispute on the merits,
must instead decide which expert to believe. Cross examination
is the lawyer's primary opportunity to give the jury reasons not
to believe the opposing expert's testimony.26
b. Cross Examination
Cross examination, the cornerstone of the adversary system's
search for truth,266 is the second weapon lawyers use to fight
sponding to study thought willingness to draw firm conclusions was important to law-
yers).
261. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1164 ("[A] witness who is forceful and unambigu-
ous may sound more authoritative than one who is appropriately tentative.").
262. See Shuman, supra note 19, at 203 (claiming that lawyers prefer experts who
reach firm conclusions above all else; 40% of 65 lawyers responding to study identi-
fied "being tentative" as the most distressing characteristic of experts); supra notes
70-78 and accompanying text (discussion of Rule 704). The Bendectin cases illustrate
this point well. Professor Sanders has written that "[iun the later Bendectin cases,
expert witnesses expressed little uncertainty as to whether Bendectin is or is not a
teratogen. Their testimony revealed little common ground." Sanders, supra note 170,
at 37.
263. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 ("[Alrguably, there are no certainties in sci-
ence.").
264. See 463 U.S. 880, 926-27 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265. See Graham, supra note 12, at 74 ("The Federal Rules place the burden on
cross examining counsel-opposing counsel must explore the underlying facts, data,
opinions, and assumptions, and otherwise discredit the testimony of the mistaken or
dishonest expert witness .during cross examination."); Miller, supra note 30, at 1084
(noting the importance of cross examination with expert witnesses under the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
266. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) ("[UMnder our adversary
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the battle of the experts. This process is especially important
due to the liberal admission of expert testimony under the
Federal Rules.267
On cross examination a lawyer typically attempts to expose
the opposing experts' lack of qualifications, lack of impartiality,
inadequate or unreliable bases in support of the expert's opin-
ion, and prior statements or opinions that are inconsistent with
the expert's trial testimony.26
Cross examination of an expert witness is not without
risk.269 The expert witness knows more about the subject mat-
ter7 ° and may well be more experienced in the courtroom
than the examining lawyer."' Even though a lawyer, through
thorough preparation, may be able to learn enough about the
subject matter to credibly examine the expert,272 the experi-
enced expert is not as susceptible as lay witnesses to manipula-
tion or intimidation by the cross examiner."' The lawyer's at-
system of justice, cross examination has always been considered a most effective way
to ascertain truth. . . ."); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross examina-
tion is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of
his testimony are tested."); Van Ness v. United States, 568 A.2d 1079, 1084 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) ("In our adversary system, cross examination plays a crucial role in un-
covering the truth. It ensures the integrity of the factfinding process.").
267. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798; Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E. 2d 297, 300 (I1.
1988) ('IT]he principal safeguard against errant expert testimony is the opportunity of
opposing counsel to cross examine."); Michael H. Graham, Impeaching the Professional
Expert Witness by Showing of Financial Interest, 53 IND. L.J. 35, 40 (1977).
268. See JEANS, supra note 152, at §§ 1538-1548 (discussing purposes of cross
examination of expert witnesses); LUBET, supra note 49, at 196-211 (1993); Graham,
supra note 12, at 69 ("On cross-examination counsel may probe the witness's qualifi-
cations, experience, and sincerity; weaknesses in the opinion's basis, the sufficiency of
the assumptions; and the soundness of the opinion.").
269. Gross, supra note 2, at 1172; see PETER MURRAY, BASIC TRIAL ADVOCACY 342
(1995) ("[Tlhe fact that the expert is usually fighting in his own territory can make
the control of the expert on cross more difficult and risky than with a lay wit-
ness .... When a lawyer takes on an expert witness in a head-to-head battle, the
expert usually wins.").
270. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1172.
271. Professor Gross found from his study of California civil trials that an "expert
is twice as likely to have testified in another such case in the preceding six months
as the attorney is to have tried one." Gross, supra note 2, at 1120.
272. Marle L.D. Wawro, Effective Presentation of Experts, 19 LITIG., Spring 1993,
31, 36.
273. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 37. Professor Sanders' study of the Bendectin
cases supports this premise. He found as follows: "[T]he Bendectin experts were not
bothered by the potentially demeaning nature of cross-examination. Several seemed to
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tempts to shake the expert's confidence in the expert's opinions
or reduce the certainty of the expert's opinions are therefore
prone to failure.274 Consequently, the cross examiner's greatest
want and need-control over the witness-is difficult to obtain
and even more difficult to maintain.275
Cross examination questions are likely to be particularly
futile include those that concern the expert's reliance on inad-
missible evidence as part of the basis of the expert's opinion.
Whether the expert has relied on statements of bystanders
about a car accident, or deposition testimony of an eyewitness
to a product failure, or conversations with fellow doctors about
a patient's history, the problems are the same: the lawyer can-
not cross examine the hearsay and the jury will be able to
consider the otherwise inadmissible evidence. The lawyer's op-
tions on expert cross examination are limited: he can seek a
limiting instruction that the inadmissible evidence is not to be
considered for its truth, but only as the basis of the expert's
opinion, and he can attempt to show that the evidence is unre-
liable or was inappropriately relied upon by the expert. Neither
approach is particularly effective because the jury, as a group of
mere mortals, will likely be unable to ignore the questionable
evidence.
Cross examination of experts focuses largely on issues of
credibility.27 That is, the examiner elicits answers that she
hopes will lead the jury to a negative response to the question:
"Should this expert be believed?" The lawyer will question the
expert's impartiality by asking about such matters as how
much the witness is being paid to testify, whether the witness
has worked for the party and/or lawyers before, and other indi-
enjoy sparring with opposing counsel, and few made a fundamental mistake on cross-
examination." Id.
274. See id.
275. See LUBET, supra note 49, at 68, 196 ("The essential goal of cross-examination
technique is witness control."); MURRAY, supra note 269, at 342 (Control of expert
witnesses is "more difficult and risky than with a lay witness."); J. ALEXANDER
TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHIcs 401, 450 (1983) (emphasiz-
ing the need to control witnesses on cross examination because "[i]f you fail to control
the cross-examination . . . the chances are that the witness will end up repeating the
direct examination and avoiding or explaining away the weaknesses in it and the im-
peachment of it").
276. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 47.
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cia of bias. 77 Some courts allow broad inquiry into these mat-
ters.278
In addition, an expert may be attacked for his "positional
bias," a term describing an expert who always testifies to the
same conclusion regardless of the circumstances or only testifies
for one side of the docket and never the other.279 Although
these attacks may bring some success, they are unlikely to help
the jury. The reality is that both experts are most likely being
paid to testify (thus telling the jury little about the weight to
attach to either expert's testimony), and the jury will probably
be unable to evaluate an expert's demonstrated bias in any
280meaningful way.
An attack on an expert's qualifications may be similarly un-
helpful. The Bendectin cases suggest that juries are not always
capable of making accurate distinctions between one expert's
qualifications and another's.28' Who is better qualified, the
Ph.D. or the witness with "real world," hands-on experience?
What particular disciplines make one qualified to offer opinions
on a specific issue? The jury is capable of making gross credibil-
ity determinations, such as distinguishing between one expert
who is paid and an opposing expert who is not, or one expert
who is highly qualified and an opposing expert who is exposed
as a quack.282 But in a typical case, involving similarly cre-
277. See Graham, supra note 12, at 73 (noting the wide variety of questions al-
lowed to show an expert's bias).
278. See, e.g., Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 301 (Ill. 1983) (allowing inquiry
into expert's annual income from services relating to expert testimony for two years
preceding trial and frequency with which the expert testifies for plaintiffs); State ex
rel. Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55, 64-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a trial
court may allow broad evidence of an expert's financial interest, including the expert's
annual income from employment as an expert).
279. See LUBET, supra note 49, at 206 (explaining cross examination on expert's
.positional bias").
280. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 47.
281. See id. at 37-38 ("Even if jurors are knowledgeable about the quality of the
academic institutions with which the experts are affiliated, it is not easy to distin-
guish an average expert from a leader in his or her field").
282. See Jacobs, supra note 219, at 1090 ("I am inclined to believe that, as differ-
ences go, those separating the quack from the Nobel Prize winner are fairly easy to
spot. Even people entirely lacking in technical training may arguably possess enough
native intelligence to deem the latter better qualified than the former".); Younger,
supra note 214, at 39-40.
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dentialed experts, the jury's evaluation of the experts' qualifica-
tions may be misguided.2"
The cross examiner can also attempt to discredit the expert's
opinion. For example, the cross examiner might force the expert
to identify all the assumptions made to reach the opinion and
suggest that one or more of the assumptions is unfounded;2"
identify matters the expert ignored or tests the expert failed to
conduct in forming his opinion;. 5 confront the expert with pri-
or testimony or writings inconsistent with the expert's current
testimony;286 or read to the jury from scholarly articles or
books that contradict the expert's reasoning or opinions.2"
Any one or more of these tactics executed effectively will show
the jury the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the expert's
testimony." s Yet, even effective cross examination does not
change the fact that the jury is still a collection of untrained
laypersons which will likely be unable to decipher the expert
testimony.
283. See Champagne, supra note 19, at 8 (showing that a juror responding to a
survey included educational credentials as an important factor that makes experts be-
lievable).
284. See LUBET, supra note 49, at 208 ("It can be extremely effective . . . to ask a
witness to alter an assumption, substituting one that you believe to be more in keep-
ing with the evidence in the case."); Miller, supra note 30, at 1084 (noting the impor-
tance of determining the key facts and assumptions that give rise to the expert's
opinion so that the cross examiner can attack the expert's testimony by showing that
the opinion would change if the assumptions were different).
285. See LUBET, supra note 49, at 206-08.
286. See Wawro, supra note 272, at 37 ("Lawyers love to impeach witnesses with
prior inconsistent statements. With experts, there can be a rich fund of such materi-
als: the expert's past work; earlier versions of the expert's report; and the expert's
deposition.. . ."). In the Bendectin cases, the lawyers "frequently attempted to im-
peach witnesses based on statements made during depositions, or . . . based on testi-
mony in earlier cases." Sanders, supra note 170, at 47-48. However, the discrepancies
were generally minor and rarely had any significance in the case. Id. Other writers
have issued similar warnings about the overuse of prior inconsistent statements. See,
e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 119 ("The really skilled expert is seldom trapped by
past overstatement."); Wawro, supra note 272, at 37 (advising lawyers to be selective
in impeaching with prior inconsistencies and to use only "short, obvious contradic-
tions").
287. See Graham, supra note 12, at 71-73 (describing use of learned treatises on
cross examination). Rule 803(18) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows for the liber-
al use of learned treatises on cross examination, although the treatise may not be
admitted as an exhibit. It is merely read to the jury. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
288. Gross, supra note 2, at 1170-71.
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Thus, the jury ultimately must rely on its common experienc-
es to evaluate experts. The result is that the jury judges the
messenger, rather than evaluating the message.5 9 In doing so,
the jury is swayed by the confidence of the expert, the conclu-
siveness of the expert's opinion, and the personality of the ex-
pert.29 ° Even if these factors are accurate predictors of trust-
worthiness for lay witnesses, they fail miserably with experts.
In fact, when juries judge experts based on their presentation
and skills as a witness, they will find most credible, and thus,
reward the professional witness, not the true "expert."291 As
Professor Samuel R. Gross has noted, the value of witness
skills such as "verbal fluency, ease of manner, the appearance
of humility, and stellar credentials as signals of truth is de-
stroyed when they become commodities that are bought and
sold in the market for effective testimony."292 The result is a
distortion of the expert testimony by the jury which leads to
inconsistent and inaccurate verdicts. One is left thinking that
the old adage, "trying a case to a jury is often a crap shoot" is
uncomfortably true.2
IV. REFORM OF EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
Calls for reform of expert witness testimony are almost as
old as expert testimony itself.294 Yet, despite the patent need
for reform, there are no obvious solutions or quick fixes. This is
shown by the hundreds of proposals for reform that have been
made since the Federal Rules were enacted,295 almost all of
289. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
290. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 47.
291. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1134.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 153
(1989) (Trial lawyers believe that submitting a case to a jury is very much like roll-
ing dice.").
294. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 96, at 56 (proposing use of panels of impartial
panels of experts).
295. See, e.g., John W. Behringer, Introduction, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 237, 238 (1986)
(introducing four articles proposing revisions of Rule 702); Giannelli, supra note 106,
at 1215 (proposing placing burden of proof on proponent of expert testimony to show
reliability before admitting the testimony); Gross, supra, note 2, at 1220-21 (proposing
mandatory use of court appointed experts and many changes to presentation of expert
testimony); Sanders, supra note 170, at 68-70 (proposing reforms in presentation of
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which have been ignored. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which jettisoned
"general acceptance" as the sole test of admission and substitut-
ed a reliability requirement, is an important first step. Howev-
er, this step is not clear enough or comprehensive enough to
remedy the ever-present partisanship that pervades modem
expert testimony. Thus, with a deep breath and great trepida-
tion,29 I propose reform of expert witness testimony.
A. Lawyer Reform Comes First
This article started with the proposition that lawyers have a
love/hate relationship with experts. Lawyers look for experts
who will work with the lawyer in shaping the expert's opinions,
then label those same experts as "whores" or "hired guns" for
doing so;... lawyers aggressively cross examine opposing ex-
perts about their fees and suggest the expert's opinions were
purchased, but still pay their own experts the same exorbitant
fees; lawyers hire experts to give opinions in every case, includ-
ing opinions about the most mundane, speculative or unreliable
matters, and then vigorously disparage the "battle of the ex-
perts" that they created.
A prominent trial lawyer describes the use of expert witness-
es this way:
[Expert witnesses] supply information that can salvage a
lost cause or turn a winning case into a loser by purposely
misleading the jurors. A lawyer who presents false evidence
can be held in contempt of court. Yet there is nothing
wrong with using professional opinion that puts the jury in
a trance and leads them off on a tangent....
Expert witnesses sell their services like anyone else in the
legal profession, and the best in the field can sound con-
vincing defending either side of an argument. Their function
is to snow the jury."'
expert testimony and possible change in factfinders).
296. Cf. Thompson, supra note 156, at 776 ("With some trepidation I add my own
suggestion concerning the usage of expert testimony.").
297. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
298. ROY GRUTMAN & BILL THOMAS, LAWYERS AND THiEVES 128 (1990). A similar
refrain is reported to have come from Melvin Belli: "If I got myself an impartial
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There is something amiss. The misuse and abuse of expert
witness testimony will never end until the "misusers" and
"abusers"-the lawyers-reform their current practices. As a
profession, lawyers must address their use of expert witnesses
and the substantial problems posed by the partisanship of ex-
perts.299 They must devise an approach to experts that pro-
vides the jury with the information it needs to resolve fact
issues, but eliminates the gamesmanship that dominates expert
witness testimony today. Short of radically changing the adver-
sary system, the only way to reform the use of experts is for
lawyers to fundamentally change their ways.
1. Reform in the Selection of Experts
First and foremost, lawyers should select experts based on
their expertise or skill instead of based on their partisan-
ship."' The problem with selecting experts based on partisan-
ship arises in two different contexts. The first is the expert who
will always testify to the same conclusion regardless of the
facts.3"' In the 1970's, a Texas psychiatrist nicknamed "Dr.
Death" testified for the prosecution in more than fifty sentenc-
ing hearings. Reportedly, he always concluded that the defen-
dant would be violent in the future whether or not he actually
examined the defendant. Dr. Death's testimony was contrary to
the position of the American Psychiatric Association, which had
concluded that no psychiatrist can accurately predict future
dangerousness." 2  Yet, he was consistently and repeatedly
called by prosecutors.
witness, I'd think I was wasting my money." Michael Specter, Diagnosis or Verdict?
Psychiatrists on the Witness Stand, WASH. POST, July 28, 1987, at Z10; see also
SPENCE, supra note 2, at 270-72 (criticizing use of expert witnesses as "a barbarous
throwback to the days of trial by duel").
299. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 127-30 (identifying the need for a change in
how lawyers deal with experts).
300. See id. at 127 (suggesting a rule that lawyers "only seek experts with legiti-
mate qualifications").
301. Professor Lubet calls this a problem of "positional bias." LUBET, supra note
49, at 204; supra note 279 and accompanying text.
302. Joseph R. Tybor, Dallas' Doctor of Doom, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 1980, at 1.
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The second expert who should be avoided is the witness who
will testify about anything for anybody.0 3 The expert who tes-
tifies about an infinite array of topics, many of which fall be-
yond the person's true expertise, and who draws most or all of
her income from testifying, is not impartial and cannot be
trusted to give a helpful, objective evaluation of the case. °4
Much like Justice Stewart's definition of obscenity, this kind of
expert is difficult to describe in the abstract, but a lawyer
knows one when he sees one.
Despite the vulnerability of these experts to cross examina-
tion, lawyers still retain them and turn their partisanship into
an indication of their expertise. The hiring lawyer tells the jury
that the expert's testifying experience shows the expert's tre-
mendous expertise or is the result of the efforts of the pertinent
industry to prevent the information from being disclosed.0 5
Lawyers rationalize their method of selecting witnesses by
speaking grandly of the adversary system and the duty of zeal-
ous representation and the ever-present safeguard of cross ex-
amination. At least one jurisdiction even espouses this rhetoric
in its rules of professional conduct telling lawyers that if a
client "wishes to have suspect evidence introduced ... the law-
yer should do so and allow the finder of fact to assess its pro-
bative value.""6 Undoubtedly, there are circumstances when
certain evidence is questionable because there are no definitive
answers in the pertinent scientific or technical field, thus the
lawyer is justified in complying with the client's desires to
introduce it. But the lawyer should at least counsel her client
about the unreliability of evidence and the lack of credibility of
witnesses.
303. See Eymard v. Pan American World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230 1234 (5th Cir.
1986); Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. 1988); supra notes 138-39 and accompa-
nying text.
304. See Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Grave Mfg. Co., 958 F.2d 1169, 1174 (1st
Cir. 1992) (Plaintiffs expert "admitted to having testified as a professional expert in
an extraordinary array of dissimilar fields," 19 of which were identified by the court
and which ranged from scaffolding to waste treatment plants to fire protection sys-
tems.).
305. Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control Over Expert Testimony: Of Deference and
Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1156, 1164 (1993).
306. See TEXAS MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.03(a)(5), comment
15.
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Zealous advocacy does not mean blind advocacy. Clearly,
lawyers should choose experts who are good witnesses and who
will advance the client's case. However, the priority should be
on getting an expert, not an advocate. The lawyer must exercise
independent judgment in the selection of experts and not hire
them reflexively. Thus, lawyers should commit to avoiding the
use of experts who, for whatever reason, are patently biased in
their favor.
2. Reform in the Preparation and Presentation of Experts
The changes in expert witness selection must be accompanied
by a new vision of how experts are prepared for their testimony
and how their testimony is presented at trial. °7 Lawyers
must change their view of the role of the expert and commit to
preparing and presenting experts as impartial educators, not
advocates of the lawyer's theory of the case."' This kind of
fundamental change will be difficult. Lawyers will have to end
the practice of preparing the expert by telling him the lawyer's
theory of the case first and then seeking the expert's opin-
ion,"9 as well as the practice of cajoling experts to stretch
their opinion or expertise when either is not to the lawyer's
liking, or when the opinion is not definitive enough. Similarly,
the practice of making certain that experts deliver their tes-
timony in terms of the ultimate issues in the case (like an
advocate would) instead of in the language of the expert's disci-
pline should also be discouraged.
Instead, lawyers should approach experts with respect and in
search of needed information. If lawyers were to view experts
as nonpartisans, they would make sure the expert had all of
the available and needed information,31 ° would help direct the
expert to the critical points on which assistance is needed, and
would structure the theory of the case based on the expert's
307. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 128 (proposing that the lawyer: (1) always fully
inform the expert of all the facts; (2) pose the question to the expert, not the answer;,
(3) give experts ethical guidance).
308. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (noting that experts serve as advo-
cates for a party).
309. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 128.
310. Id.
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opinion. Moreover, if an expert gave the lawyer an opinion that
seemed clearly out of line or seemed suspect, even if it favored
the lawyer's client, the lawyer would seek a second opinion
from another expert to help ensure the reliability of the first
expert.
The unfortunate truth, of course, is that this new lawyer I
envision will not become a reality, and the rules of conduct I
propose will be generally ignored. In 1883, Henry Wade Rogers
voiced concerns about the partisanship of experts in his
day,"' but the practice did not change. Lawyers are just as
susceptible as experts to the lure of the almighty dollar. The
adversarial method of trying lawsuits is too entrenched to allow
for fundamental change. And, in any event, the sense among
lawyers that "everybody is doing it" makes the risk of one law-
yer treating experts differently too great for most to even try.
B. Identifying the Right Reform
If attitudes are unlikely to change, perhaps the problem of
partisan experts is best reformed by eliminating the payment
for testimony."1 If experts were not paid for their time there
would be no professional witnesses and many of the incentives
that plague the current system would disappear. Undoubtedly,
the mere suggestion of such a change would be greeted in the
legal community (not to mention the expert witness community)
as heresy or worse. 13 The impediments to implementation of
such a change would be overwhelming. Lawyers would encoun-
311. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 199, 448-51 (stating that expert witnesses are
too readily available, are not free from bias, and act as "hired advocates" when they
testify). Rogers quotes Grigsby v. Clear Lake Water Co., 40 Cal. 404, 405 (1870) as
follows:
[Ilt must be painfully evident to every practitioner that these witnesses
are generally but adroit advocates of the theory upon which the party
calling them relies, rather than impartial experts, upon whose superior
judgment and learning the jury can safely rely.
Grigsby, 40 Cal. at 405.
312. See TANFORD, supra note 143, at 459 (noting that experts are no less suscep-
tible to financial inducements than lay witnesses).
313. But see SPENCE, supra note 2, at 271 (proposing that experts be subject to
subpoenas and that they testify for a "fixed statutory fee"); TANFORD, supra note 143,
at 460 (remarking that some experts who testify lose no income from their industrial
or university jobs when they serve as experts).
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ter practical problems, such as a paucity of persons willing to
serve as experts, and more serious problems, such as constitu-
tional ones. Clearly, no such change is forthcoming.
Others have proposed similarly fundamental changes in the
adversary system's use of experts. Professor Gross has proposed
the adoption of mandatory court appointed experts wherein all
experts would be appointed by the court based upon the party's
selection but without the party's participation." This would
reduce to some degree the partisanship of experts. Others have
proposed the use of "blue ribbon juries" consisting of well edu-
cated members of the community, or even a science court con-
sisting of scientists from the pertinent discipline.315 These pro-
posals are helpful. They demonstrate the seriousness of the
expert witness problem, and they bring creativity to very diffi-
cult issues. Yet, I do not believe that these proposals are any
more likely to be adopted than my suggestion that the rules
prohibit experts from receiving compensation. The proposals,
and others like them, require too much change at too great a
price.
In fact, a much less controversial proposal-the increased use
of court appointed experts-has been largely rejected by practic-
ing lawyers and judges despite its widespread appeal to com-
mentators. As Professor Gross has noted, the frequency of the
proposal to use court appointed experts is equalled only by the
rejection of the proposal. 1 The theories for this reluctance
are varied and have been thoroughly addressed elsewhere. 17
Although I believe that court appointed expert witnesses would
help reduce expert partisanship, I propose amending the rules
of evidence in hopes of bringing about needed reform.
314. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1220.
315. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 79-82.
316. Gross, supra note 2, at 1193.
317. See, e.g., id. at 1193-94 (noting judge concerns about having to find the right
expert and about "intervening" in the lawsuit and lawyer concern about losing control
over the expert and the prejudicial effect of a court-appointed expert's opinion on the
jury).
1446
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
C. Reform of Rule 702
One of the primary reasons expert testimony is so prevalent
today is because of the liberal rules of admission.31 The
greater allowance of expert testimony has led to greater abuses
of expert witnesses. Thus, the rules themselves must be
changed to stem the tide. The widespread abuses facilitated by
the loosening of expert testimony rules necessitate reform of all
aspects of the admission of such testimony, starting with Rule
702.3' 9
1. Daubert's Deficiencies
Although Daubert provides a good starting point for the dis-
cussion of reform, the court's opinion does not resolve many of
the problems with experts, and instead, creates uncertainty.
The concerns about Daubert are three-fold: (1) the shaky deci-
sional basis of the Court's opinion; (2) the uncertainty of the
scope of the Court's opinion, and (3) the likely inconsistent
application of the Court's opinion.
The Supreme Court's decision turned on the reliability re-
quirement the court found in Rule 702's phrase "scientific ...
knowledge."320 The Court's construction of the Rule is suspect.
First, there is no indication from the language of Rule 702 or
from the legislative history that the expression "scientific
knowledge" was intended to impose a reliability requirement.
Rather, the more likely meaning of the phrase is simply to
identify the general fields of knowledge from which experts may
be drawn. "21 The limitations in Rule 702 are the requirements
318. See supra Part II.
319. See McElhaney, supra note 12, at 55-56 (proposing reform of all of the expert
witness rules).
320. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
321. Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries From Themselves: Restricting the Admis-
sion of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103, 147-48 (1994).
Rather than citing to legal authority in support of its construction of Rule 702, the
Court cited to one of its favorite sources-the dictionary and two amicus briefs. See
id. at 147.
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that the expert's knowledge "will assist" the jury and that the
expert is qualified.322
Second, a comparison of Rule 701323 regarding lay witness
testimony and Rule 702 supports this construction. In Rule 701,
where the drafters intended to require more than helpfulness
before allowing lay opinions into evidence, they included the
explicit requirement that lay opinions must be "rationally
based" on the witness' perceptions.3' Not only does Rule 702
not contain a similar provision, but the advisory committee's
note states that the standard for admitting expert testimony is
assisting the trier of fact.3 1
Third, the Court places heavy reliance on its unsupported
conclusion that the omission of "Frye" or "general acceptance"
from Rule 702 and its legislative history means the drafters
rejected that standard.32 The drafters of Rule 702 may have
simply failed to consider the admission of scientific testimony in
the drafting process. 2 7 Frye and "general acceptance" are con-
spicuous by their absence. But that fact is ambiguous: it could
support the view that the drafters would have mentioned Frye
if they meant to overrule it or the position that the failure to
mention Frye suggests an intent to reject the general accep-
tance standard. 2
322. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
323. Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.
FED. R. EVID. 701.
324. See id.; see also Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190
(3d Cir. 1994) ("Rule 701's requirement that the opinion be 'rationally based on the
perception of the witness' demands more than that the witness have perceived some-
thing firsthand; rather, it requires that the witness's perception provide a truly ra-
tional basis for his or her opinion.").
325. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note ("Whether the situation is a
proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assist-
ing the trier.").
326. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
327. See Gianelli, supra note 106, at 1207.
328. See id. Of course, the Supreme Court took the omission by drafters to signal
a rejection of "general acceptance," Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
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Daubert is also inadequate because of uncertainty about its
scope. Does the opinion apply only to scientific matters or only
to novel scientific matters, or to all types of expert testimony? In
the short time since Daubert was decided, courts have reached
dramatically conflicting conclusions about Daubert's intended
scope. Some courts have applied Daubert to clearly nonscientific
expert testimony while others have limited its application to
only novel scientific matters.329 Moreover, even courts that ap-
ply Daubert to expert testimony about all scientific matters
must define "scientific," and must distinguish between what is
"scientific," and what is "technical" or "specialized." For exam-
ple, does "scientific" include the so-called soft sciences as well
as the hard sciences? Rule 702 should be revised to clearly
require the same standard of reliability for all expert testimony.
Finally, Daubert leaves uncertainty about how it should be
applied. Although Frye was often criticized for the lack of pre-
dictability it provided,3 ' admission under Frye arguably relied
329. Some federal courts have restricted Daubert to novel scientific evidence. E.g.,
lacobelli Constr. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (Experts in areas
of geotechnology and underground construction were not "the kind of junk science'
problem that Daubert [was] meant to address."); Lappe v. American Honda Motor Co.,
857 F. Supp 222, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (refusing to apply Daubert to testimony of an
accident reconstruction expert because Daubert applies only to "novel scientific evi-
dence.").
Other federal courts have viewed Daubert as reaching all scientific expert testi-
mony. E.g., Vadala v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 44 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating
that Daubert is limited to "scientific law" and does not apply to accidents); Tamarin
v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993) (Daubert "specifically dealt with
the admissibility of scientific evidence."); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp.
1027, 1041 (S.D.N.Y, 1995) (Finding "no support for the proposition that Daubert
extends past the 'scientific' branch of Rule 702," the court did not apply Daubert to
nonscientific experts before it.); Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.,
1993 WL 311916 at *3 (N.D. IM. 1993) (refusing to apply Daubert to expert testimony
about commercial real estate appraisal); cf Hopkins v. NCR Corporation, 1994 WL
757510, at *6 (M.D. La. 1994) (Daubert cannot be applied to some areas involving
"specialized knowledge," but should only be applied when "the type of expert knowl-
edge submitted is at a minimum quasi-scientific.").
And still other courts have applied Daubert to distinctly nonscientific matters.
E.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1183-84 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying
Daubert to economics of cocaine trade); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938-39
(2d Cir. 1993) (applying Daubert to expert testimony about the structure and opera-
tion of an organized crime families' structure), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1645, 1646
(1994); Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1993) (ap-
plying Daubert to expert testimony about the valuation of a corporation's partnership
interest).
330. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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on a more objective basis than Daubert does. That is, under
Frye the scientific community's consensus or lack of consensus
on a particular theory was determinative of admission for the
judge. Of course, despite its objective standard, Frye was sub-
ject to manipulation by judges in that it was not consistently
applied to certain areas of expertise.33'
Under Daubert this inconsistent application may be more
true than ever, as judges are given the responsibility to deter-
mine the reliability of a technique or theory.332 Some language
in Daubert might encourage a judge to minimize the gatekeeper
responsibility and admit arguably unreliable expert testimony,
leaving the jury to make the tough calls about the testimo-
ny.333 One court, remarkably enough, has concluded that its
role after Daubert is simply to screen expert testimony under
Rule 104(b) and to let the jury decide reliability any time there
is an issue about the reliability of the expert's theories or tech-
niques." That is directly contrary to Daubert.335 The bottom
line is that Daubert's reliability standard does not change the
difficult task of courts. Perhaps the Arizona Supreme Court, in
Arizona v. Bible,36 a post-Daubert decision wherein the Court
rejected Daubert's formulation of Rule 702 in favor of retaining
Frye's general acceptance test, said it best when it concluded:
"[E]ven were we to use Daubert's reliability/scientific validity
analysis, we would still be left with the problem posed by Frye:
precisely when 'in [the] twilight zone the evidential force of the
[scientific] principle must be recognized.' 337 The court conclud-
ed: "that line is hard to draw."33 Rule 702 should be amended
331. See Gianelli, supra note 106, at 1209.
332. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 (describing judge as a "gatekeeper" who must
make "preliminary assessment" of the scientific validity of the reasoning or methodol-
ogy used by the expert).
333. John W. Strong, Development in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of
Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1509, 1514-16 (1995).
334. See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
("[U]nder Daubert, the Court perceives its role ... as being a 'screener' of expert
testimony, similar to its role under [Rule] 104(b).").
335. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
336. Arizona v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1578 (1994).
337. Id. (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
338. Id.
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so that (to the extent possible) courts have clear direction about
how to apply the standard of admission.
2. Current Efforts to Reform Rule 702
Due to the uncertainty created by Daubert, revision of Rule
702 is once again the subject of formal reform efforts. On
March 8, 1995, the House of Representatives passed the Attor-
ney Accountability Act, which included amendments to Rule
702."' The amendments serve two purposes: (1) to codify
Daubert's reliability requirement; and (2) to prohibit contingent
fee agreements with experts.3"
The amendment of Rule 702 would, in civil cases, only im-
pose a requirement that scientific expert testimony meet the
requirements of reliability and relevance as Daubert re-
quires."4 Of much greater significance and interest, however,
339. Federal Rules Watch: Senate Prepares Alternative Amendment to Rule 702, 9
INSIDE LITIGATION, May 1995, at 15 [hereinafter Federal Rules Watch]. The amend-
ment would revise Rule 702 to provide as follows:
(a) In general-If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
(b) Adequate basis for opinion.-Testimony in the form of an opinion by a
witness that is based on scientific knowledge shall be inadmissible in evi-
dence unless the court determines that such opinion-
(1) is scientifically valid and reliable;
(2) has a valid scientific connection to the fact it is offered to
prove;
(3) is sufficiently reliable so that the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the dangers specified in Rule 403.
(c) Scope. Subdivision (b) does not apply to criminal proceedings.
H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995).
Others have also proposed adding an explicit reliability requirement to Rule
702. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., 1993 RULES, STATUTE AND CASE SUPPLE-
AIENT 84 (1993) (Proposed an amendment to Rule 702 by the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilem-
ma-A Reliability Approach, 26 JUPIETRICS J. 240, 241 (1986) (proposing to insert
the word "reliable" after the word "I' at the beginning of Rule 702). At least one
state has amended their Rule 702 to require scientific expert testimony to be based
on scientifically valid theories and techniques, and did so before Daubert was decided.
See IND. R. EVID. 702.
340. See Federal Rules Watch, supra note 339, at 15.
341. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §3 (2)(b) (1995).
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is the Act's requirement that in civil cases the probative value
of scientific expert testimony must outweigh the dangers out-
lined in Rule 403.342 This requirement, which is identical to
the admission standard for specific instances of a sexual
assault's victim's prior sexual behavior under Rule 412(c)(3)'
and prior convictions of a criminal defendant under Rule
609(a)(1), 3" would change the balance of expert witness testi-
mony from a presumption of helpfulness to a presumption of
unhelpfulness. 31 It would place the burden of proof on the ad-
mission of expert testimony on the proponent of the evidence
instead of the opponent as Rule 403 requires.31 Criminal cas-
es would operate under the current version of Rule 702, pre-
sumably without any independent requirement of reliability.'
The Senate version of amended Rule 702, which has not yet
been put to a vote, differs materially from the House version: it
applies to both civil and criminal cases, and it adopts the gen-
eral acceptance test for "techniques, methods, and theories used
to formulate [the expert's opinions] ... within the relevant
scientific, medical or technical field."3' This change would ap-
parently expand Frye to almost all expert testimony.349
342. Id.
343. See FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3). Commonly known as the "rape shield doctrine,"
Rule 412 severely limits the admission into evidence of prior sexual conduct by the
victim and requires that the judge determine after an in camera proceeding whether
the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice posed by
the evidence. Id.
344. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). Due to the substantial risk of unfair prejudice
that arises when prior convictions of a criminal defendant are introduced at the
defendant's trial, all such convictions that do not involve dishonesty or false state-
ments are excluded unless the probative value of the conviction exceeds the prejudi-
cial effect. Id.
345. MUELLER, supra note 62, at 243-44. Rule 403 is generally recognized as a
"rule of admission." That is, the probative value of most relevant evidence is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See id. at 193. On the other hand, when
the standard is shifted to require greater probative value than prejudice, the standard
is much more one of exclusion. Id. at 243-44.
346. Id. at 245.
347. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d) (1995). This aspect of the amendment
of Rule 702 is of substantial concern, particularly in light of the many reliability con-
cerns presented by forensic scientific evidence. See Paul C. Gianelli, "Junk Science'.
The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 113-17 (1993) (noting need
for particular attention to reliability in criminal context due to potential impact of
evidence and unproven reliability of some evidence).
348. Federal Rules Watch, supra note 339, at 15.
349. See id. Such a proposal would likely encounter practical problems in applying
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Ultimately, these proposals do both too little and too much.
3. A Proposal to Require Both Reliability and Necessity in
Rule 702
The current standard for admitting testimony of expert wit-
nesses reflects an unrealistic view of modern expert witness
practice. Rule 702's "liberal thrust" is inconsistent with a paid
expert working as an advocate to persuade the jury of the
client's position. The Rules should be skeptical of experts, not
trusting and accepting. In that way, expert witness testimony
can be appropriately analogized to hearsay evidence. Both kinds
of evidence present serious concerns about the jury's compe-
tence and they both hold similar positions as exceptions to Rule
402's pronouncement that "all relevant evidence is admissi-
ble."350 The hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 are
based on the heightened degree of trustworthiness, extreme
need, or both, that attach to the excepted statements.35' The
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule explicitly require a
showing of both trustworthiness and need."'
Expert witness testimony presents greater concerns about
jury competence than hearsay testimony does, particularly when
dealing with complex technical and scientific evidence. 53 Yet,
under the Federal Rules expert testimony is often freely admit-
Frye to nonscientific matters.
350. FED. R. EVID. 402; see Epstein, supra note 175, at 1159-60 (excluding hearsay
serves the same purpose as excluding unreliable expert testimony); Faigman, supra
note 208, at 885 (analogyzing the hearsay exceptions to expert testimony); Giannelli,
supra note 106, at 1247-48 n.379 ("Novel scientific evidence can be viewed in much
the same way as hearsay."); Edward J. Imwinkleried, The Next Step After Daubert:
Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonsci-
entific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2282 (1994) (comparing require-
ments of reliability and necessity for exceptions to the rule against hearsay to
Daubert's requirements of reliability and necessity for expert testimony).
351. See IRVING YOUNGER, HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH THE THIcKET
45-47 (1988).
352. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b)(5). The two exceptions provide, in perti-
nent part, that "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule, if, inter alia, "the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can pro-
cure...." Id.
353. Faigman, supra note 205, at 881.
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ted, while hearsay is at times subjected to a more exacting
standard."S This does not make sense, especially in light of
the tremendous concern about the abuse of expert witnesses
and the growth of partisan expert witness testimony.
Professor Irving Younger's classic formulation of the "rule of
thumb" for admitting hearsay is a helpful standard for experts
as well. Younger's algebraic formula is N + R = L"5 Thus,
the greater the need for the evidence, the less a showing of
reliability is required. Conversely, the greater the reliability of
the evidence, the less need matters.3 6 Rule 702 should codify
Daubert by restricting expert testimony to that which is based
on reliable theories and techniques. This requirement should
extend to all types of expert testimony in all kinds of cases.
Moreover, the Rule should be amended by requiring that mar-
ginally reliable expert testimony satisfy a necessity require-
ment, limiting expert testimony to that which is needed by the
jury to resolve an issue in the case.
a. The Reliability Requirement
The first requirement is that expert testimony must be de-
rived from reliable theories, techniques, or methods and that
the expert's opinions given from the witness stand should follow
from sound, verifiable analysis. The reliability requirement,
however, should not be limited to scientific theories or tech-
niques. A uniform standard of reliability would help reduce the
uncertainty of Daubert and the practical problems of application
it has caused.
The reliability requirement should apply to all expert testi-
mony because of the concerns outlined in part III, including the
partisanship of experts, the failure of the adversary system to
354. See FED. R. EVID. 803 & 804.
355. See YOUNGER, supra note 351, at 46.
356. Id. This restructuring of the Rule might provide an analytical framework for
some perplexing areas of expert testimony. For instance, future predictions of danger-
ousness by psychologists have long been admitted, despite their lack of reliability. See
supra notes 229-30. Apparently, the basis for the admission is that "future dangerous-
ness" is a legal requirement in some contexts, and thus, the jury needs the best
possible information on the issue even though not reliable. Of course, under my pro-
posal, if the theory is unreliable it is excluded, regardless of need.
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effectively root out marginal expert testimony, and the deficien-
cies of the jury in evaluating expert testimony. These problems
are not limited to testimony about scientific matters. In fact,
nonscientific expert testimony deserves even greater skepticism
because there is often no ability to test the technical expert's
theories or- techniques or to prove false the expert's underlying
premise. Finally, evidentiary policy requires that all evidence
satisfies a minimum standard of reliability.35 ' The rules of
evidence that require personal knowledge and limit the admis-
sion of hearsay impose a reliability requirement,358 which
should be extended to the long-ignored nonscientific expert
testimony.
The more perplexing dilemma is in the application of the
reliability criterion. Two primary issues arise: (1) what stan-
dard should be used to measure reliability; and (2) how can the
judge determine the reliability of scientific or technical theories
used by experts.
i. Application of Reliability Requirement to Scientific Matters
The question concerning the appropriate standard for measur-
ing reliability was answered correctly (at least as to scientific
matters) by the Supreme Court in Daubert: reliability must be
measured by scientific validity.359 The critical inquiry into sci-
entific validity is whether the theory or technique has been
tested. 6 ° If it cannot be tested it is not valid. If it can be test-
ed, the query is: what is the error rate that is attached to the
technique?36'
Judge Zagel of the Northern District of fllinois delivered one
of the most eloquent discourses on the judicial process of
searching for reliability in his opinion in Mercado v. Ahmed."2
Judge Zagel anticipated the holding in Daubert and recognized
the importance of a judge's careful inquiry into the reliability
and validity of expert testimony."' Judge Zagel defined valid
357. See Imwinkleried, supra note 350, at 2281.
358. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9 (citing to Rule 602 and the hearsay rules
as examples of the rules' insistence on evidentiary reliability).
359. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
360. See id.
361. See id,
362. 756 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. IMI. 1991).
363. Id. at 1100-01 (' B]efore I admit the evidence of an expert in a discipline
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expert opinions as those that "can be verified or proven in some
way."" He described validity as follows:
[Vierification of science is to be found in the accuracy of its
predictions. A scientific principle is valid if its use tells us
that some defined thing will occur and we perceive that it
does occur .... Sometimes prediction is subtler: A theory
explains a past occurrence and predicts that we will, if we
look in a certain place, find proof of this.365
The "falsifiability" of a theory or technique and the error rate
in applying the technique constitute direct evidence of reliabili-
ty. Despite its importance, or perhaps because of it, this inquiry
is a daunting task for the judge. 6 On remand in Daubert,
Judge Kozinski spoke for district and appellate court judges
everywhere when he described this "heady" responsibility: Fed-
eral judges must now "resolve disputes among respected well-
credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their
expertise in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to
what is and what is not 'good science,' and occasionally to reject
such expert testimony.... 367
Undoubtedly, judges will gravitate toward the more familiar
indicia of reliability: general acceptance, peer review and publi-
cation, the qualifications of the expert, and the development
and uses of the pertinent theories or techniques outside of the
litigation context. 368 For example, the Ninth Circuit, in consid-
ering Daubert on remand, focused on the lack of peer review
and publication of the theories of plaintiffs' experts and the fact
that the theories were not developed independently, but instead
were developed specifically for the Bendectin litigation.5 9
whose acceptance by courts has not been established by binding precedent, I should
assess the degree to which the discipline is characterized by reliability among its
practitioners and by validation of its theories.").
364. Id. at 1098.
365. Id. at 1098-99.
366. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th
Cir. 1995).
367. Id.
368. These factors and others are appropriate considerations for the judge. For
various factors courts consider, see Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97; 43 F.3d at 1316-
17; United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3rd Cir. 1985); Kelly v. Texas,
824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc).
369. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317-18.
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These factors do provide judges with circumstantial evidence of
reliability. They may well be dispositive in many cases. Univer-
sal acceptance or rejection of an expert's underlying method-
ology in the pertinent scientific community should end the
inquiry and will likely be appropriate for judicial notice.7 °
However, in closer cases judges must resist the temptation to
rely on these factors to the exclusion of direct evidence of valid-
ity.
3 71
ii. Application of Reliability Requirement to Nonscientific Mat-
ters
Rule 702 should also require that nonscientific expert testi-
mony be reliable. 2 Many of the same considerations apply.
The expert's motivation will still be important. The judge
should ask: Is the expert's theory one that was specifically
developed for the litigation.?3 73 Moreover, the acceptance of the
expert's theory in the pertinent nonscientific community should
also be a factor in the reliability analysis.
In this context, however, the qualifications of the expert will
be of particular importance. This is so because in the nonscien-
tific world, theories are often not subject to testing or experi-
mentation.3  Although the focus of the inquiry must still be
on verification of the expert's methodology,375 the inquiry is
more difficult because much nonscientific expert testimony is
based on the experience of the expert, instead of experimenta-
tion. 6 For example, when a detective testifies as an expert
370. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (asserting that widespread acceptance by
scientists may be a very important factor for court).
371. Strong, supra note 333, at 1518-19.
372. See Imwinkleried, supra note 350, at 2281 (proposing extension of Daubert to
nonscientific matters); Linda S. Simard & William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper:
The Role of the District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TULANE L. REV.
1457, 1471 (1994) (same).
373. Cf. Simard & Young, supra note 372, at 1474 ("[p]ractical uses . . . to which
[expert's] theory has been put by the expert or others will provide evidence of exter-
nal scrutiny and validation.").
374. Imwinkleried, supra note 350, at 2280.
375. See Simard & Young, supra note 372, at 1471.
376. See Imwinkleried, supra note 350, at 2289 ("[e]xperience is to nonscientific
experts as experimentation is to experts."); John W. Strong, Language and Logic in
Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restorations of Function, Reliability,
and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 368 (1992) (Nonscientific experts espouse "general
propositions ... [that] have undergone no process of verification other than daily
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on the modus operandi of a drug dealer,377 the detective's the-
ory is that there is a certain consistency with which drug deal-
ers act. What is the basis for his theory? The detective's basis
is his experience observing and participating in drug transac-
tions.37 The same is true for an accountant testifying in a
professional malpractice case or a banker testifying about the
"commercial reasonableness" of a secured party under Section 9-
504 of the Uniform Commercial Code or a stockbroker testifying
about the suitability of an investment. The theories on which
these experts base their opinions are largely the result of their
experiences.
Accordingly, as Professor Imwinkleried has written, the judge
must ensure that the expert's experience is sufficient both in
terms of quantity (the number of times the expert has had the
experience) and quality (the similarity of the experiences the
expert has had to the subject of the expert's testimony).379 In
these situations, there is a remarkable convergence of Rule
702's three prongs: qualification of the expert, reliable theories
and techniques, and assistance to the jury in deciding an issue.
An expert without sufficient experience in number or kind
should not be allowed to offer an opinion because she is not
qualified, her opinion would not be reliable, and it would not
help the jury.
iii. Two Concerns About Application of the Reliability Require-
ment
One notable concern about using experience as the bench-
mark for judging the validity of nonscientific experts is that
courts will fall back on the bare-bones requirements of Rule
702 and allow any self-proclaimed expert to say anything. To
avoid this, the judge should require a clear articulation of the
expert's theory and a complete disclosure of the basis of the
observation.") (citing James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revital-
ized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 252-53
(1986)).
377. See United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving
expert testimony about the operations of narcotics dealers).
378. Cf. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 937 (2d Cir. 1993) (qualifying an
FBI agent as an expert on the inner workings of an organized crime family by 17
years experience as an agent and five years in the FBI's Organized Crime Program).
379. Imwinkleried, supra note 350, at 2290-94.
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expert's opinions. The purpose is two-fold: (1) to insure that the
subject matter of the expert's theory is properly the subject of
expert witness testimony; and (2) to provide the judge the infor-
mation needed for an epistemological analysis of the expert's
theory.3"
Undoubtedly, even diligent judges will find their newly ac-
quired responsibility to be taxing. At least part of the difficulty
exists because even a uniform standard of admission does not
allow for a uniform analysis of every expert's testimony, as has
been demonstrated above. Flexibility will be critical for judges
as they encounter new fields of knowledge and revisit old
ones.
38 1
For example, in United States v. Starzecpyze1. 2  Judge
McKenna faced a very old type of expert in a very new context.
He had to decide whether, after Daubert, a forensic document
examiner's (FDE) expert testimony constitutes scientific knowl-
edge and, if so, whether it is based on reliable theories and
methodologies.3" The difficulty of the task can be measured in
part by the prolixity of Judge McKenna's opinion. It took twen-
ty-three pages for the judge to decide that forensic document
examination is not scientific knowledge and that it satisfies the
requirements of Rule 702 for "technical or other specialized
knowledge." Forensic document examination is a practical skill,
and thus, not subject to Daubert.3"
Judge McKenna's opinion is admirable for the care and
thought with which he approached and decided the issue. He
held a "Daubert hearing," carefully considered the expert testi-
mony from the hearing and scholarly writings about forensic
document examination, rigorously analyzed the evidence under
380. See Simard & Young, supra note 372, at 1471-72 ("[E]pistemological analysis
begins by clearly identifying the theory on which the expert proposes to base her
testimony."). Epistemology is the "branch of philosophy that investigates the origin,
nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge." Id.; see Imwinkleried, supra note
350, at 2275-76 (describing history of modern epistemology as developed by John
Locke).
381. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2927 ('The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a
flexible one.").
382. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
383. Id. at 1028-29. Judge McKenna is a federal district court judge in the
Southern District of New York. Id. at 1027.
384. Id. at 1028-50.
1995] 1459
1460 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1389
Rules 702 and 403, and admitted the testimony under condi-
tions designed to avoid unfair prejudice and to ensure reliabili-
ty.38
5
Yet, the fundamental ruling-that forensic document exami-
nation is not "scientific knowledge"---contradicts prior case
law,88 the characterization of FDE's themselves, 7 and the
opinions of both recent and ancient legal commentators."
Moreover, as Judge McKenna readily recognized, forensic docu-
ment examination is testable, has been tested, has an error
rate that may be quite high (although that fact is highly dis-
puted), and its theories have been subjected to very limited
peer review.389 All of this convinced the judge that Daubert
would require exclusion of the FDE's testimony, and thus, he
simply opted to not apply Daubert.9 0
Despite his well-crafted opinion, Judge McKenna's conclusion
is subject to criticism. Many scientific theories or techniques
385. Id. The Daubert hearing lasted from February 28 through March 2, 1995 and
included testimony from three experts. Id. at 1028. Judge McKenna described the
testimony in some detail. See id. at 1036, 1044 nn.21-25. He also analyzed each of
the four "guidelines" from Daubert and ultimately concluded that forensic document
examination was a "practical skill" and not scientific and that its admission would
help the jury determine the authenticity of a document. Id. at 1029, 1045-46. Finally,
the court took several measures to ameliorate concerns about unfair prejudice under
Rule 403, including preparing a jury instruction about the nature of forensic docu-
ment examination and limiting the definitiveness of the expert's opinion. Id. at 1048-
49.
386. See, e.g., United States v. Buck, No. 84 CR 220-CSH, 1987 WL 19300, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding forensic document examination to be scientific by using the
relevancy test, which applies only to scientific evidence).
387. As Judge McKenna noted, the literature is replete with references to forensic
document examination as a science. See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1048 n.28 (cit-
ing DAVID ELLEN, THE SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS (1989); ORDWAY
HILTON, SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION OF QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (1982); AND WILSON R.
HARRISON, SUSPECT DOCUMENTS: THEIR SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION (1958)).
388. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD S. IMWINKLERIED, SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE 789-851 (1986) (discussing questioned document examination as one kind of
scientific evidence); ROGERS, supra note 311, at 292 (noting that "there is such a
thing as a science of handwriting").
389. See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1036-38. Michael J. Saks testified at the
Daubert hearing that one study showed that document examiners reached the correct
answer 52% of the time as opposed to 50% for laypeople. Id. at 1037. In another
study only 13% of the examiners reached the correct result. See D. Michael Risinger,
et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of
Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 746 (1989).
390. See 880 F. Supp. at 1028.
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rely on the experience or training of an individual to interpret
or apply the underlying scientific principles. Opinions of experts
using firearms identifications, fingerprint analysis, and
bitemark identification are based on the experience of the ex-
pert and, although based on objective data, involve elements of
subjectivity.39' An even more analogous technique is voice
identification, which is based on the same basic propositions as
forensic document examination: that every individual is unique
in the way they speak or write and that no one speaks or
writes exactly the same way from one time to the next.392 In
addition, just as a voice identification expert knows that
individuals are capable of disguising or changing their
voices,393 FDEs have to account for the fact that a person can
modify their handwriting. Yet, voice identification is recognized
as a science and has been subjected to judicial scrutiny accord-
ingly.394
The subjectivity of the technique does not change the
technique's essential scientific character. Instead, it necessitates
paying particular attention to the qualifications of the expert in
each instance and is an additional factor the court should con-
391. GIANELLi & IMVINKLERIED, supra note 388, § 13-3, 374-75.
392. Compare id. § 10-2, 311 with Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1031. This phe-
nomenon is referred to as interspeaker or writer variation, meaning that no two peo-
ple write or speak in the same way, and intraspeaker or writer variation, meaning
that a person never pronounces or writes the same word exactly the same way. See
GIANELLI & IMWINKLERIED, supra note 388, § 10-2, 311. This fundamental premise,
according to one of the expert witnesses in Starzecpyzel, "is based on little more than
the faith of those who subscribe to it." Michael J. Saks, Implications of the Daubert
Test for Forensic Identification Science, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 427
(1994).
393. In Starzecpyzel, the court noted the subjectivity of forensic document examina-
tion, resulting from natural variation and other factors such as disease, intoxication,
the passage of time and the ability to purposefully disguise one's handwriting as
support for its conclusion that FDE is not scientific. 880 F. Supp. at 1038-41. The
same concerns apply to voiceprint analysis. See Brian R. Clifford, Voice Identification
by Human Listeners: On Earwitness Reliability, 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 373, 380
(1980). While these variations make the techniques less reliable, they do not change
their essential nature. Cf. id. (showing that experts matched disguised voices only
21.6 to 23.3% of the time). In fact, the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence notes
that voiceprint evidence has "gradually faded from the courtroom" after a committee
of the National Academy of Sciences raised questions about its accuracy. FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 75 (1995) (citing
COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 10 (1979)).
394. See GIANELLi & IWINKLERIED, supra note 388, § 10-1, at 309-27.
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sider in deciding whether to exclude the testimony as unreli-
able. 95 Starzecpyzel illustrates the consequence of not extend-
ing the reliability requirement to all expert testimony and, at
the same time, the difficult questions that arise from any at-
tempt to categorize expert testimony as scientific and nonscien-
tific. Perhaps the most important lesson of Starzecpyzel, howev-
er, is that Daubert, if properly applied, may well exclude expert
testimony that courts have grown accustomed to admitting.39
b. The Necessity Requirement
When the reliability of the expert's theories or techniques is
marginal, Rule 702 should require that the jury needs the testi-
mony before it is admitted. The necessity requirement would
reverse the "presumption of helpfulness" that many courts em-
ploy when reviewing expert testimony.97 Thus, instead of the
current practice of admitting expert testimony when in doubt, a
decidedly ill-advised policy in light of the many dangers of
expert testimony, the amendment would require the proponent
of the testimony to demonstrate that the jury needs expert
assistance to resolve an issue. Marginally reliable testimony
would require a greater showing of need than other expert
testimony.
395. See id. § 10-2, at 313 (Application of voice identification technique "depends[s]
heavily on the qualifications of the particular examiner."); id. § 21-7(E), at 848 (Ex-
aminations by unqualified "secondary experts" result in no better than 50% accuracy
in handwriting analysis.).
396. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means for Fo-
rensic Science, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 2103, 2117 (1994) ( Ilf Daubert is taken serious-
ly, then much of forensic science is in serious trouble.").
397. Others have previously proposed a more stringent helpfulness requirement.
For example, in May 1992 the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure proposed that Rule 702 be amended to provide, in pertinent part, the fol-
lowing:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information,
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, may be received if (1) it is rea-
sonably reliable and will, if credited, substantially assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue....
WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 339, at 84. The addition of the word "substantially"
before "assist" would obviously increase the level of helpfulness required of expert
testimony.
Professor McElhaney, in the wake of Daubert, proposed that Rule 702 be
amended to make expert testimony "only admissible when it is necessary to a fair
resolution of the issues in the case." McElhaney, supra note 12, at 55.
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In some ways, this proposal invokes the common law require-
ment that expert testimony is appropriate only on matters that
are beyond the jury's comprehension.398 Thus, expert testimo-
ny about the meaning of certain words 99 or the amount of pu-
nitive. damages necessary to punish a corporate defendant"'
would be excluded as unnecessary. On the other hand, issues
on which the jury needs great assistance, such as the standard
of care in a professional malpractice case401 or forensic DNA
testing,40 2 would be admitted upon a showing of reliability.
Of course, often these matters are not black and white. Some
issues are matters that the jury is able to decide without assis-
tance, but about which expert testimony would deepen the
jury's understanding or identify misconceptions the jury may
hold.0 3 It is in this netherland that the amendment would
have its greatest impact. Perhaps it would be felt most directly
by experts on matters of human behavior, such as sociologists,
psychologists, psychiatrists, human factors engineers, and the
like.
Social science expertise is now a frequent voice in the court-
room. For example: a psychologist espouses theories about how
people respond to certain experiences (so-called syndrome testi-
mony)4°. and explains the unreliability of eyewitness identifi-
cations,0 5  a psychiatrist predicts a person's future con-
398. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
399. World Boxing Council v. Howard Cosell, 715 F. Supp. 1259, 1264-65 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that the jury was capable of reading Cosell's book and comparing it to
articles he claimed to have relied on without the assistance of plaintiffs expert, an
expert in media relations and communications research).
400. See Farrall v. A.C. & S. Co., 558 A.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
401. Savage v. Christian Hosp. Northwest, 543 F.2d 44, 47 (8th Cir. 1976).
402. See Arizona v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993) (DNA is not an area
where the jury can easily penetrate the "aura of infallibility.").
403. See 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 702-15 (There is no "bright
line separating issues within the comprehension of jurors from those that are not.");
Strong, supra note 376, at 356 ("The 'beyond the ken' rule . . . somewhat unrealisti-
cally suggested a division of subjects into those about which the jury was informed
and those which it was not.").
404. E.g., United States v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Kan. 1995) (admit-
ting "battered woman syndrome" evidence offered through psychologist to explain how
women who are battered typically act); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind.
1995) (allowing a clinical psychologist to testify that the victim exhibited symptoms
that are commonly found in teenagers who have experienced sexual abuse, concluding
that the victim suffered from "child sexual abuse syndrome").
405. E.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (admitting
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duct,45 and a human factors engineer describes for the jury
how reasonable people behave. 47 The scientific basis for much
of this testimony is suspect, leading one commentator to label it
"suppositional science."4 8 Yet, it is more and more frequently
admitted purportedly because it will assist the jury.49 The
theory seems to be that more information is always better for
the jury. It is not.
This kind of testimony, perhaps more than any other, is
susceptible to partisanship and the ills that accompany it. Syn-
drome testimony, for example, consists of an expert describing
for the jury the typical response of a person who has had a
particular experience or experiences, such as child abuse, rape,
or spousal abuse, for the purpose of convincing the jury that
the experience took place or that the victim should be be-
lieved.4" Thus, the profile is subject to manipulation by the
expert to fit the circumstances of the case. The expert becomes
an advocate, telling the jury in scientific terms about why the
jury should believe the victim, a matter the jury is capable of
evaluating without help.41' Even though courts will often not
expert testimony on eyewitness identification); Arizona v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208,
1218 (Ariz. 1983) (holding that a psychologist should have been allowed to testify
about the unreliability of eyewitness identifications); California v. McDonald, 690 P.2d
709, 726 (Cal. 1984) (admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification). The
psychologist in Chapple, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, has written a book about her experi-
ences as an expert witness on matters of human perception and memory. See ELIZA-
BETH LOFTUs & KATHERINE KETCHAN, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE 4-13 (1991).
406. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
407. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Human Factors Experts in Personal Injury
Litigation, 46 ARK. L. REV. 338-49 (1993) (describing the uses of human factors engi-
neers in cases involving diving injuries, slip and falls, and product'liability cases on
issues of design and warning defects).
408. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1013 (1989) (stating
that social science findings that have not undergone scientific testing or have been
tested inadequately are identified as "suppositional science").
409. See Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ind. 1995) (stating that child
sexual abuse syndrome has been admitted by many state courts); Wayne T. Westling,
The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases,
71 OR. L. REV. 93, 93-99 (1992) (describing increased judicial acceptance of expert
testimony as eyewitness identifications).
410. See Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 493-94 (identifying the purposes for which child
sexual abuse syndrome testimony has been admitted).
411. The context in which this testimony is typically used may contribute to a loss
of objectivity by the expert. See Michigan v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich.
1990). The Michigan Supreme Court identified this concern as follows:
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allow the expert to draw the final inference that the event took
place or that the victim is believable when she says the event
took place,412 the effect is the same. The problem is that most
psychologists agree that there is no "typical response."413
A necessity requirement would help judges focus on whether
the expert witness brings to the stand more than their own
suppositions or beliefs and more than "mere" argument about
who the jury should or should not believe. In that way the
necessity requirement is similar to the amendment to Rule 702
recently passed by the House of Representatives, which requires
that the probative value of expert testimony outweigh the Rule
403 dangers.4 4 Under that proposal, marginal expert testimo-
ny would often be excluded because of its low probative value
when balanced against concerns of unfair prejudice, confusing
or misleading the jury, and wasting the court's time.4 5 How-
ever, the amendment applies to civil cases only, which is too
narrow, and creates a rule of exclusion typically utilized only
when a risk of extreme prejudice is presented by the introduc-
tion of the evidence, a standard which is too broad to apply to
all civil expert testimony.4 6 The necessity requirement is pref-
Given the abhorrence of the crime, it is inevitable that those who treat a
child victim will have an emotional inclination toward protecting the
child victim. The expert who treats a child victim may lose some objec-
tivity concerning a particular case. Therefore .... we caution the trial
court to carefully scrutinize the treating professional's ability to aid the
trier of fact when exercising discretion and qualifying such an expert
witness.
Id.
412. Id. at 405.
413. See Pennsylvania v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1992) ("[albused children
act in a myriad of ways that may not only be dissimilar from other sexually abused
children, but may be the very same behaviors as children exhibit who are not
abused."); see also New Hampshire v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 700 (N.H. 1993) (same
concerns).
414. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. § 3(2)(b) (1995); supra notes 339-47 and
accompanying text.
415. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
416. Under Rule 412(b)(2) the standard of probative outweighs prejudice is applied
to prior sexual conduct by the victim of sexual assault. The purpose of the
exclusionary standard in that context is to encourage victims to come forward and to
limit their humiliation when doing so. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2) & advisory committee's
note. Rule 609(a)(1) protects criminal defendants from the extreme prejudice that
often accompanies the admission of a prior felony conviction. See FED. R. EVID.
609(a)(1). No similar social policy concerns are present .with most expert testimony.
Yet, the standard might well be appropriate if it was limited to novel scientific mat-
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erable because it is a familiar standard in evidence law gener-
ally, and expert witness testimony specifically, and it strikes
the appropriate balance for admission of expert testimony.
In a case involving reliable expert testimony, "necessity"
would encompass the relevancy requirement that courts cur-
rently apply to experts under Rule 702's helpfulness provision.
Most important in this regard is Daubert's instruction that
proposed expert testimony must "fit" an issue in the case.417
Thus, the Ninth Circuit on remand found that testimony by
plaintiffs' experts in Daubert did not satisfy the "fit" require-
ment because they could not testify that Bendectin more than
doubled the risk of birth defects, which California law required.
The testimony was not helpful (and certainly not needed) be-
cause, even if taken as true, it did not support a verdict for
plaintiffs.418 The syndrome testimony, discussed earlier, and
other expert testimony about human behavior, should be care-
fully scrutinized for fit. The syndrome profiles, for example,
have been developed to assist psychologists in the therapy set-
ting and were never intended to be used to identify an abus-
er.419 In that way, the syndromes may not help the jury.
c. Objections to Changes in Rule 702
There are at least two obvious concerns about amending Rule
702 in the manner I have proposed. The first concern is wheth-
er greater restriction on the content of expert testimony is ap-
propriate, as opposed to the adoption of procedures to enhance
understanding and comprehension of expert testimony4 2° and
ters, which hold the greatest potential for misuse. See Berger, supra note 20, at 245
(proposing adoption of probative standard instead of prejudice standard in Rule 702
for application to novel scientific evidence).
417. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
418. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F. 3d 1311, 1320-21 (9th
Cir. 1995).
419. See Faigman, supra note 408, at 1057.
420. See Sanders, supra note 238, at 1435-37 (restrictive admissibility rulings are
an inappropriate solution to the jury's problems with complex scientific testimony).
Although Professor Sanders fully recognizes the difficulties encountered by the juries
in the Bendectin cases, he believes that the problems were caused by deficiencies in
how the evidence was presented, not with the fact that the evidence was admitted at
all. See Sanders, supra note 170, at 27. Nevertheless, on more than one occasion
Sanders has noted the possibility of using "blue ribbon juries" or science courts to
decide complex cases. Sanders, supra note 238, at 1439; Sanders, supra note 170, at
81. This suggests the depth of Sanders concern about the jury. I would prefer to
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rulings by the judge on the sufficiency of the evidence. Un-
doubtedly, much could be done to enhance the jury's ability to
evaluate experts and many excellent reforms have been pro-
posed."' Nevertheless, the fundamental problems cannot be
changed: experts are often powerful witnesses; they are parti-
san; they add a significant cost to litigation when used; and
they give testimony that is difficult if not impossible for the lay
jury to accurately evaluate.
Limiting expert testimony to that which is shown to be reli-
able and necessary will directly reduce, though surely not elimi-
nate, the significance of those problems. It makes good sense,
not to mention good evidentiary policy, to exclude expert testi-
mony that is based on unreliable theories or techniques so that
jurors can choose between reliable methodologies in reaching
their verdict. Substantial costs are added to the system by
liberal rules of admission through more protracted litigation
(because of the ability to avoid summary judgment with the aid
of an expert), inflated settlement values, and greater litigation
costs (brought on by the need to retain rebuttal experts). The
liberal rules also create uncertainty in decisionmaking, which
causes a loss of confidence in the system.
The second concern arises from the first: Should the judge or
the jury decide questions of reliability when there is a reason-
able dispute. 2 Most judges have no scientific training. How
can they make these often complex, sometimes imponderable,
decisions? Justice Rehnquist in Daubert dissented from the
majority's discussion of how federal judges should determine
reliability for that very reason. He expressed concern about
judges having to become "amateur scientists."4
adopt more restrictive rules of admission than to take the issue away from the jury
altogether. Moreover, some of the proposed refinements, such as juror note-taking and
question-asking, may help with recall by the jury, but I do not believe it would sud-
denly enable the jury to decipher the evidence. Similarly, structural changes, such as
bifurcated trials, will help focus the jury's attention on the pertinent issue, but it will
not better equip the jury to distinguish what is reliable from what is not.
421. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1269-80; Sanders, supra note 170, at 61-75.
422. Black, supra note 23, at 787.
423. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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Yet, judges are better suited than juries to make these diffi-
cult decisions about which testimony is based on reliable theo-
ries and which is not. Despite some commentators who suggest
that the judge is no better than the jury in evaluating these
matters and despite the occasional error made by judges,424
common sense and logic point in favor of the judge.4' The
judge has many advantages: (1) the judge is more proficient in
engaging in critical analysis than the jury; (2) the judge has
the benefit of experience-over time the judge will develop an
understanding of the critical factors necessary to distinguish the
valid from the invalid beyond the understanding of the uniniti-
ated jury;4 25 and (3) the judge has procedural advantages over
the jury-he can obtain assistance from a variety of sources,
including briefs of the parties, pertinent articles, transcripts of
witnesses, and other material such as the Federal Judicial
Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 427 and he
can control expert testimony through his management of the
case.
4 28
Nevertheless, even with substantial experience and assis-
tance, judges may occasionally need additional help in making
reliability decisions. That additional assistance could come from
court appointed experts under Rule 706 or, perhaps more effec-
tively, from a new position called "court adjunct" or "judge's
technical aid" who would assist the judge by overseeing the
424. E.g., Imwinkleried, supra note 212, at 560. A commonly cited example of
judicial error is Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga
1985), wherein a federal district court judge erroneously concluded that Orth-Gynol
Contraceptive Jelly causes birth defects, contrary to the available scientific data. See
Gross, supra note 2, at 1124 (discussing Wells and district court's analysis); see also
supra notes 382-96 and accompanying text (criticizing Judge McKerma's conclusion in
United States v. Starzecpyzel).
425. See Black, supra note 23, at 787 ("[W]e agree with Daubert's preference for
preliminary judicial screening only because judges are in a better position than juries
to acquire and consider the kind of information that bears on the resolution of such
disputes."). Cf. Faigman, supra note 408, at 1014 (asserting that judges are capable of
understanding and evaluating scientific reliability).
426. Black, supra note 23, at 787-90; see Strong, supra note 334, at 1512; see also
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Robinson, No. 94-0843, 1995 WL 359024, at *9-
10 (Tex. Jun. 15, 1995) (concluding that on the whole judges are competent to evalu-
ate reliability).
427. This manual is a product of a joint effort by the Federal Judicial Center, a
federal agency established by Congress in 1967 and the Carnegie Corporation of New
York. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
428. See Black, supra note 23, at 787-90; Strong, supra note 333, at 1517-18.
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expert testimony in the case and helping the judge understand
difficult or complex issues .429 This role would be more admin-
istrator than witness, like a specialized magistrate, and would
almost certainly require statutory amendments. Although such
a proposal is not new, it is more pressing now because of the
responsibility Daubert places on judges and the ever-expanding
universe of topics for expert testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
Soon after the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, Pro-
fessor Graham gave a most unflattering description of expert
witness practices:
A glib and unscrupulous expert witness with no qualifica-
tion in his professed field other than a willingness to sell
any opinion to anyone who wants it will frequently out sell
the conscientious, well-trained and careful expert who gives
no opinion that he cannot back up. The concept that
the . .. jury can detect a fraud is absurd." °
Now, almost two decades later, the expert witness industry has
grown exponentially and with it the misuse of experts as mere
partisan mouthpieces.
Yet, lawyers have the ability to slow the madness by using
experts responsibly and by respecting experts for their impor-
tant role in the adjudication of disputes. This new relationship
calls lawyers to a vision of the expert as "expert" and not as
advocate and team member. Judges have a role to play as well.
They must take seriously their role as "gatekeepers" and com-
mit to the difficult, but critical, task of separating the reliable
from the unreliable. Cautious admission of expert testimony, as
429. See Robert S. Thompson, Decision, Disciplined Inferences and the Adversary
Process, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 725, 777-79 (1991) (proposing use of experts as adjuncts
in a "civil law format," wherein the expert would "receive the reports of the ad-
versarial expert's pretrial, seek clarification where indicated, determine where the re-
ports diverged and suggest areas of further inquiry"). For a similar proposal, see
Edward V. DiLello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judg-
es at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 493-507 (1993) (proposing creation of
Magistrate Judge Experts (MJE) to assist the judge with difficult evidence).
430. Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the FRCP:
Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 189 n.44.
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opposed to the reckless acceptance permitted under the Federal
Rules, is not only appropriate in light of the evidentiary policy
of ensuring that evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability
before it is admitted, but also is necessary due to the rampant
partisanship of experts and the limitations of the adversary
system.
In many ways these proposals contemplate a step back to a
time when experts were viewed by lawyers and judges with
skepticism, and when the common law placed limits on expert
testimony in many ways. Adopting this outlook will help courts
more effectively meet the challenges that expert testimony will
surely present in the future. At the same time, however, courts
must recognize the need to take on the new task of deciding
expert reliability issues for themselves. This will ensure the
preservation of the fundamental values of the adversary system.
